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A 


DETAILED ACCOUNT 


OF THE 


BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ, 


BY THE 


AUSTRIAN MAJOR-GENERAL, 

STUTTERHEIM. K - ^ > ■- iLsnn* 

** 


TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH 


BT 

■ *- 

MAJOR PINE COFFIN, 

\ ' - ' : 

\ . ' , , « ' • 

ASSISTANT QUARTER-MASTER-GENERAL TO THE BRITISH ARMY. 


Toufrcela, prouve, qu’il y a beaucoup cFhommes, capables de faire manoeuvrer, 
quinze a ving mille homines, et qu’il en est peu, qui puissent tirer tout le parti 
possible, d’une artnee de quatre-vingt mille hommes. 

Note par un officier Francois. 


LONDON: 

PRINTED FOR T. GODDARD, MILITARY BOOKSELLER, 
NO. 1, PALL-MALL, CORNER OF THE HAYMARKET. 


1807 . 


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I ! ¥ U ' J : |! ; ' '•' " ' ' 






W. Marcfrant, Printer, 3, Grevilk-street, Holbein** 






TO THE PUBLIC. 


THE fatal consequences that resulted 
from the battle of Austerlitz, to the cause 
of Europe, and of humanity, render it an 
object of too deep an interest with the 
statesman and the soldier to make an 
apology requisite for introducing to the 
public, what may be considered as the 
Austrian official account of that action. 
It is hardly probable, that, under a govern¬ 
ment so constituted as that of Austria, a 
general officer would have ventured to pub¬ 
lish the particulars of an action, in which 
he himself bore a conspicuous part, (at 
least with his name attached to it,) unless 
he felt himself sanctioned by the highest 
authority in so doing. 


A 


However that may be, the work bears 
evident internal marks of authenticity, 
while the events daily passing under our 
eyes, with such dazzling, and unprece¬ 
dented rapidity, give an additional interest 
to the cause which has been productive of 
.such direful effects . 

Scarcely have twelve months elapsed since 
this disastrous battle was fought, and al¬ 
ready have we seen new dynasties created, 
and the proudest empires levelled in the 
dust. 

We have seen one of the most powerful 
monarchies of Europe, whether it be con¬ 
sidered as to its military resources, or its 
well replenished treasury; as ta its well 
disciplined army, or the glorious recollec¬ 
tion of its past achievements: we have 
seen the armies of Prussia, which were 
wont to be considered as the patterns of 
military excellence, dissipated and anni- 


5 


hilated, like chaff before the wind, by the 
well-trained legions of the modem Alex¬ 
ander. 

The present state of Europe affords 
ample scope to the reflections oi* the 
statesman. For, though the soldier may 
account for the loss of a battle, by rea¬ 
soning on what was done, and what was 
left undone, the subjugation of states is 
to be looked for in causes far remote from 
the scene of action. These are times 
which not only require superiority of in¬ 
tellect in those who govern, but the convic¬ 
tion on the part of the governed , that they 
are not mere spectators of the fray; that 
it is not a mere squabble for power; but 
that the happiness of each individual, that 
the preservation of all he holds most dear, 
in short, that the liberties of his country are 
at stake, and depend upon the issue of the 
contest. 


6 


Has this been, or could it be, the feeling 
of those nations of the Continent we have 
seen overrun? 

In the answer to this simple question, 
we may perhaps find the real cause of all 
the disasters of the coalition, and subject 
of much contemplation for ourselves. 
The cloud which has been long gathering 
over Europe has begun to burst; we have 
seen the storm fall where least expected, 
and bury whole empires, and their people, 
in one common ruin. When the demon 
of destruction is abroad, let us not be 
unmindful of ourselves. Are we better 
prepared than our neighbours? Have we 
more skilful generals, or less intriguing 
politicians? I fear not. It is then only 
to the people we can look in the day of 
trial; and I trust there is yet enough left 
of the genuine spirit of the constitution, 
and of the native valour of Britons, to 


7 


make every man feel his country is worth 
contending for. The moment that ceases to 
he the case , our independence as a nation 
is •virtually gone; and, though our empire 
may drag on a precarious existence for a 
few years, it will fall, inevitably fall, at no 
distant period. 

I have been inadvertently led into a 
train of reflection, which some persons 
may think not quite compatible with the 
character of a soldier. Against this opi¬ 
nion, I beg leave to enter my protest. I 
have always considered the superiority of 
the French troops over those of the con¬ 
tinent, as the result of their individual 
intelligence; arising in a great degree 
from the habit of every Frenchman, to 
discuss whatever topic comes under his 
notice; and it is quite unnecessary for 
me to remark, that the powers of the 
mind only develope themselves in pro¬ 
portion as they are called into action. 


8 


Let us hear no more then ot soldiers being 
mere machines. The absurdity of the 
doctrine is too palpable to need refuta¬ 
tion. 

I ought perhaps to assign some reason for 
having undertaken a labour, to which I may 
appear so very unequal. It was to relieve 
my mind from constantly dwelling on a 
subject of disappointment, which still 
weighs but too heavily on my spirits; and 
which I hoped to alleviate, though it can¬ 
not be removed by occupation. Personal 
vanity had no share whatever in it, and if 
I have not concealed my name, it has been 
because I hoped to disarm the severity of 
criticism by avowing it. Much will not 
be expected from one, who embraced the 
profession of arms at a very early period, 
and whose ambition, from a child, has been 
military and not literary reputation. All 
that I can flatter myself with having suc¬ 
ceeded in, is, the rendering the sense of 


9 

the author, in terms plain and intelligible. 
For elegance of style, and flowing periods, 
the public may look to a Hutchinson, but 
not to soldiers in general. 

JOHN PINE COFFIN. 

P. S. It was my original intention to have 
annexed a good map to this work, on which 
the reader might be enabled satisfactorily 
to follow the operations with his eye;—but 
having in vain ransacked the shops of 
London, without being able to procure a 
map of Moravia on a scale sufficiently 
large to make it of any use; and, in fact, 
without finding any that was better than 
Chauchards, which is woefully deficient, 
both in the names of villages, and in geo¬ 
graphical accuracy; I have been induced 
to publish the Battle of Austerlitz without 
this advantage. My principal motive for 
so doing has been the persuasion, that a 


10 


bad map could be of very little use; and 
that it would enhance the expense to such a 
degree, as to place the work beyond, the 
reach of many military men; while others 
may be already in possession of as good, 
or better information than I could furnish 
them with. To those, however, who do 
not already possess a map of Moravia, I 
would recommend that published by Covens 
and Mortier, at Amsterdam; not as the 
best possible map, but as the least defec¬ 
tive I have seen. But, I have great doubts 
whether this is to be procured in England. 


TO THE 


AUSTRIAN ARMY. 

THIS account of what passed under my 
own observation at the Battle of Austerlitz * 
and of the result of my researches on that 
memorable event , I here dedicate to my bre¬ 
thren in arms. The desire of being read by 
all the military men in Europe has induced 
me to write in a language more generally 
known than that of Germany , and which 
there are few among you who do not under¬ 
stand. Those who , like myself have borne 
a pari in this disastrous day of the 2d De¬ 
cember ., will be enabled to bear testimony to 
the truth of this narration. I have prided 
myself on using the greatest impartiality; on 
having stifled all prepossession , all passion 9 


12 


and every feeling , that could tend to lead my 
judgment astray. It is to your approbation , 
my brother soldiers , that I look forward , as 
the ?nost delightful recompense of all my 
labours . 


INTRODUCTION. 


THE imperfect accounts which have 
reached the public, as to the details of 
the Battle of Austerlitz, are so contradic¬ 
tory to each other, and so little satisfactory 
to military men, that it has been thought 
proper to lay the following relation before 
them, in order to fix their ideas as to this 
memorable epoch. 

In all ages, as in all countries, nations 
&nd armies have been the slaves of opinion. 
Hence it has ever been the policy of go¬ 
vernments to heighten, by those means 
best calculated to excite national enthu¬ 
siasm, the splendour of even the greatest 
victories; as well as to give a specious co¬ 
louring to those reverses of fortune, which 
too public to be passed over in silence. 


14 


The soldier, who here gives the relation 
of what he himself saw, neither wishes to 
Hatter a government, nor to gain the good 
opinion of an army. His object will be, 
to detail, with truth, what he has either 
seen or been able to discover from others; 
and, forgetting the part he himself acted, 
he will speak with candour and impartiality 
of the events that passed under his own 
observation, without the slightest tincture 
of prejudice, or passion. Of these events, 
posterity must be the judge. 

Nothing will be found here, but the 
simple recital, without commentary, naked, 
and devoid of art, of one of the most fa¬ 
mous epochs of history. To attempt to 
reason on the operations of wars that have 
passed in our times would be giving too 
much scope to self-love, which always 
adopts or rejects, as suits our own opi¬ 
nions. 

It is not the strength of the respective 


15 


armies opposed to each other at the battle 
of Austerlitz, or the losses they sustained* 
which particularly distinguishes it, from 
many of those which took place in the first 
campaigns of the French Revolution, and 
the seven years war* 

We have heretofore often seen 150,000 
men in the field, and 30,000 slain. But it 
is the consequences of the action of the 
2d of December, 1805; it is the epoch 
when it decided the fate of war; it is the 
moment in which it was fought, which 
makes it worthy of attention, and which 
w r ill assigti it a marked place in history. 

It was the wish to gain personal infor¬ 
mation that induced the author to collect 
materials, which may become useful to 3, 
better pen: and he avails himself of a 
leisure moment to offer them to such as 
have the talent to make use of them. 

In order that the past may serve to elu¬ 
cidate the future, it becomes requisite to 


16 


recur to the circumstances that led to this 
decisive day; which proved how scrupu¬ 
lously accurate it is necessary to be, in 
making the calculations and combinations, 
to which the existing circumstances and the 
knowledge of human nature give rise. 

The battles of Crenxs, and of Hollabrunn, 
are already well known. This is not in¬ 
tended as a history of the late campaign, 
but merely of a part of it, into which the 
account of those two affairs does not enter. 
It was after they had taken place, that M. 
de Koutousoff directed his retreat upon 
Brunn, and effected it from that moment, 
without much annoyance from the enemy. 
This first Russian army had orders care¬ 
fully to avpid a serious engagement, and to 
hasten its retreat, for the purpose of form¬ 
ing a junction with that under M. de Rux- 
hoevden, who w~as advancing rapidly to its 
support. M. de Koutousoff executed a 
difficult retreat from the river Inn, upon 


17 


Moravia, which commenced on the 14th 
October, and lasted till the 18th Novem¬ 
ber; and, although very inferior to the 
enemy in point of numbers, this Russian 
army effected its junction without much 
loss. The farther the grand French army 
advanced, the more its combinations be¬ 
came multiplied, and the more it was 
obliged to detach its force. The Russian 
general had the advantage of being enabled 
to concentrate during his retreat, which he 
also effected in good order: for this he was 
principally indebted to Prince Bagration, 
who conducted the rear-guard with much 
courage. The two Russian armies formed 
their junction at Wischau, on the 18th of 
November; from which time they became 
07 ?e, under the command of the General 
in Chief, Koutousoff. Its strength con¬ 
sisted of 104 Battalions, 20 of which were 
Austrians; and 159 squadrons, 54 of 
which were Austrians, and 40 Cosacks. 

B 


18 


The Austrian corps was commanded by 
Lieutenant General Prince John de Liech¬ 
tenstein: his infantry was composed of 
the 6th Battalion, recruited, armed, and 
organized about a month before; 1VX. de 
Kienmayer, with the remains of his corps, 
(very much weakened by the movement 
of M. de Merveldt on Styria,) formed a 
part of the corps under Prince John de 
Liechtenstein. The Archduke Ferdinand, 
with the wreck of the army from Ulm, and 
some Battalions, also newly raised, was in 
Bohemia, and thereby covered the right of 
the combined army; which might at this 
time be computed at about 72,000 men. 
The corps under the Archduke Ferdinand 
was composed of from 18 to 20,000 men. 

The grand French army, after passing 
the Danube, had advanced into Moravia, 
being composed of the corps under Prince 
Murat, Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Ber- 
nadotte. The last of these was then op- 


19 


posed to the Archduke Ferdinand, and 
was advancing upon Iglau. Marshal Da- 
voust, after having followed M. de Mer- 
veldt into Styria, moved from Vienna 
upon Presbourgh. The corps of Marmont 
marched upon Carinthia, and then upon 
Styria; in the first instance, to open the 
communication between the grand army 
and that of Italy; and afterwards, to 
oppose the junction of the Archduke 
Charles with the army under M. de Kou- 
tousoff; but the movements of this prince 
were so well calculated, and his force so 
well concentrated, that he did not allow 
time for the French to establish themselves 
at Gratz. Marshal Ney, after the passage 
of the Inn, took his direction on the Tyrol, 
by Scharnitz. 

At the time of the junction of the two 
Russian armies near Wischau, they had 
only opposed to them, the corps of Prince 
Murat, part of which formed the advanced 
* b 2 


20 


guard, those of Marshals Soult and Lannes, 
the imperial guards, under Marshal Bes- 
sieres, and a corps of grenadiers, drawn 
from these different troops, forming a reserve 
of 15,000 men, under General Duroc. 
This army, when near Brunn, was com¬ 
posed of eight divisions, each of which 
was about 7000 strong. The Russian army 
was so much fatigued with the continual 
marches it had been making, whether to 
fall back on the support, or the support to 
get forward in time, that it was decided at 
Wischau to take up the position of Olmutz, 
to give some days rest to the troops. 

Opinions were at that time much divided. 
The Russian advanced posts had no sort of 
information as to the position and force of 
the enemy; at one time, even Prince Ba¬ 
gration was ignorant of the situation oc¬ 
cupied by the French advanced guard. 
The Austrians also, notwithstanding the 
facility they ought to have possessed of 


21 


procuring intelligence in the country, had 
only very vague data to act upon. 

By this information, however, it appeared, 
that the French forces were collected only 
in small numbers near Brunn; and some 
generals of the combined army gave their 
opinion at Wischau, for immediately resum¬ 
ing the offensive. It is possible, this moment 
might have been more fortunate than that 
which was afterwards chosen. The strength 
of the coalesced army was, from the 19th 
of November, superior to that of the 
enemy, who was yet uninformed that the 
junction of the two Russian armies was ef¬ 
fected, and therefore could not expect an 
offensive movement,* such as a manoeuvre 


* Note by a French officer .—A general, whose move¬ 
ments are not so combined as to enable him to oppose 
another manoeuvre to that of his enemy, whatever it may 
be, is a general devoid of talent, and ignorant of the art 
of war.. 





on either of his flanks would have been. 
The army was then too near him to admit 


If the Russians had assumed the offensive at Wischau, 
it would have been previous to the arrival of the corps 
under the Grand Duke Constantine, which would have 
weakened their army by 10,000 chosen men. The French 
army would not only have had Marshal Bernadotte with 
them, who was then at Znaim, but also the corps of 
Marshal Davoust, whose divisions were in echelons, on 
Nicolsburgh. 

In fact, it was natural to suppose the combined army 
would not abandon the capital of Moravia without a 
battle. It was well known that Brunn was a fortified 
town, that there was much artillery, large magazines of 
powder, and warlike stores of all kinds in it: its possession 
seemed to merit an action, and it was expected. Although 
the arrival of General Buxhoevden was not positively 
known, yet spies had reported it, and all the information 
received as to the march of that army in Poland, and 
the two Galicias, rendered it so probable, that all the cal¬ 
culations of the French army were founded on the suppo¬ 
sition of this junction. 

The 19 th November, Prince Charles had not passed 
Goritz; he therefore could not enter into the most remote 



23 


of his receiving reinforcements near Brunn. 
But this very diversity of opinion, perhaps 


calculation relative to the war in Moravia. The whole 
French army was collected, so that, if the Russian army 
had wished to maintain the important point of Brunn, 
and to defend the magazines in that place, it would two 
days after have been attacked by Prince Murat, by the 
corps of Marshals Soult, Lannes, and Davoust, and by 
part of that under Marshal M or tier. The Russians would 
have had 10,000 chosen men less than at Austerlitz, and 
the French 30,000 men more : and if it is asked, why, at 
Austerlitz, the French had not these 30,000 men more, it 
is, because the Emperor Napoleon, being informed that 
the Russian army was retiring from Wischau, and falling 
back on Olmutz, conjectured that the Russians were 
waiting for the third army under Michelson, in order to 
resume the offensive ; or meant to take up a position under 
the guns of Olmutz, and so wait till Prince Charles ap- 
proached nearer to the theatre of operation. 

Obliged to oppose both these armies; the emperor had 
detached Marshal Davoust to Presbourgh, and Marshal 
Ney into Carinthia. The corps under these two Marshals 
would have supported General Marmont, and have had 
the corps of Marshal Mortier as their reserve; and above 



24 


rendered the movement on Olmutz ne¬ 
cessary, because those in command did 


90,000 men would have attacked Prince Charles, before 
he could approach the Danube: and, vice versa , if the 
third Russian army, under Michelson, and the com¬ 
bined army, under Olmutz, (which were calculated by 
their junction to amount to 120,000 men) should resume 
the offensive; whether they advanced by Kremsir, or 
direct upon Brunn, the calculation had been made so as 
to be joined in a short time, by Marshal Bernadotte, who 
had made two days march upon Iglau; by Marshal Da- 
voust, one of whose divisions was only two, and the other 
four marches distant; and lastly, by Marshal Morder, who 
would also have arrived in four marches, and who, under 
this supposition, would have been replaced at Vienna by 
one of the Generals, Marmont or Ney. 

These Were skilful dispositions; the object of which 
was, to oppose equal force to the enemy, although in 
reality superior in numbers to the French army. 

When the Russians assumed the offensive, it was known 
that Michelson had not joined them. The Emperor Napo¬ 
leon was of course astonished, and immediately saw how ill 
combined was the system of the allies. It was not till after 
the battle of Austerlitz, and by jeports from Galicia, that 



25 


not possess that decision, which can only 
be the result of a military eye. 

The Austrian general Weyrother, had 
been sent into Galicia, for the purpose of 


it became known that Michelson had no army; that he 
was only the Inspector of the two other corps; and that 
the Russians, after the arrival of the Grand Duke Con¬ 
stantine, had nothing more to receive. 

As soon as he learnt the offensive movement of the 
Russians, the emperor recalled Marshal Bernadotte, the 
remainder of the corps of Marshal Davoust and General 
Marmont. If he gave battle at Austerlitz, without having 
been rejoined by the last divisions of Marshal Davoust, 
and those of Marshal Mortier, it was because he saw so 
favourable an opportunity, that he not only was persuaded 
he should gain the battle without these reinforcements, 
but even had he 30,000 men less. 

The allies then did well to wait the arrival of their rein¬ 
forcements before they resumed the offensive. They 
calculated rightly, in letting the emperor be the first to 
make his movements, and must have conceived the hope 
of afterwards gaining by it, when they should themselves 
come to act upon their own plans. 



26 


conducting the army of Buxhoevden through 
the hereditary states. He was an officer 
of reputation, who did not want for talent, 
and who had inspired the Russians with 
confidence. As soon as the two armies be¬ 
came united, he filled the situation of Quar¬ 
ter-master general. The court of Vienna 
had previously selected General Schmidt 
for this important trust; but that officer, a 
man of superior merit, and who, with a 
talent for the profoundest calculation, pos¬ 
sessed that tranquil wisdom, which gives 
reason and deliberation in counsel; af¬ 
ter having shewn himself, at Crems, to be 
worthy of the confidence that was placed 
in him, lost his life there, and was thus 
snatched from the hopes of his sovereign, 
and of his brother soldiers. His loss was 
the more sensibly felt, and the more regret¬ 
ted, because his successor, neither possessed 
his calmness, his prudence, or his firmness. 
The army marched, the 21st of November, 


27 


from Wischau, and arrived the next day 
but one, in the position in front of Olmutz, 
whither we will follow it, for the purpose of 
detailing the operations, 

March of the Combined Army into the Posi¬ 
tion of Olmutz . 

It was on the 23d of November, the 
army arrived in this position, and was 
posted in rear of the village of Ollschan. 
Its left rested on the river March; its right 
extended to the heights in rear of Tobolau. 
In this manner it lay upon its arms, in three 
lines; while the Austrian corps, under Prince 
John de Liechtenstein, formed the reserve 
of the army, on the heights in rear of Schna- 
belin, and was principally intended to se¬ 
cure, in case of a check, the passage across 
the March. With this view, several bridges 
were constructed across that river, between 
Nimlau and Olmutz, to facilitate the opera- 


28 


tion. The ground occupied by the army 
in this position, offered great advantages. 
It was so commanding, throughout its whole 
extent, from the heights near Nimlau, to 
the right of the position, as to discover 
nearly a league in its front, all the enemy’s 
movements in case of attack; while the 
slope of the hills in its immediate front 
was so gentle, as to resemble a glacis. In 
its rear, spacious ravines, only of sufficient 
depth to conceal large columns of troops 
from the enemy, which might unexpectedly 
be brought into action, facilitated the 
means, in this defensive position, of manoeuv¬ 
ring offensively, under cover of the heights. 
Along their summit, there were command¬ 
ing points, which mutually defended each 
other : and on which, the numerous artil¬ 
lery, with which this army was provided, 
might be employed with great success. A 
morass covered the right, and a part of the 


29 

centre ; the Blata ran at the foot of these 
heights, on which heavy batteries might 
have been constructed : this little stream, 
although insignificant in itself, became an 
additional obstacle, under the fire of grape. 
To sum up all, the ground offered the means 
of delaying the enemy, in his attempt to 
overcome these obstacles, and to open out. 
The General Bagration, with his advanced 
guard, was at Prosnitz. General Kien- 
mayer, with his, upon the left, at Kralitz, 
pushed on detachments upon Klenowitz. 
The out-posts were at Predlitz. An Aus¬ 
trian partisan was sent along the March, on 
Tobitschau, Kogetein, and Kremsir, to 
observe that country. The French army 
had also sent a partisan, from Goeding on 
Hradisch, and Kremsir; but the latter was 
repulsed, and the Austrian detachments 
remained masters of the March. It will 
not escape the observation of intelligent 


so 


military men, that this was an advantage 
which gave the allies the means of manoeuv¬ 
ring by their left, while their right (which 
would then have rested on the March) was 
secured ; and would have masked this 
movement, so as to give them, at least two 
days march in advance. The good under¬ 
standing, at that time subsisting with Prus¬ 
sia, appears to have been such, as to have 
made it expedient for the allied army, to 
think of establishing a communication with 
the Archduke Charles. But, in determining 
on offensive movements, nothing appears 
to have been thought of, but going straight 
forward. 

M. de KoutousofF had also sent some 
Austrian partisans, on his right flank, who 
marched upon Tribau and Zwittau, whither 
the Archduke Ferdinand, who was at Czas- 
lau, had sent some parties of light troops, 
to keep up the chain of communication. 


31 


Prince Murat arrived, on the 18th of No¬ 
vember, at Brunn. His advanced guard, 
under general Sebastiani, pushed forward 
in the first instance, to Rausnitz, and af¬ 
terwards entered Wischau, after Prince 
Bagration had evacuated it. The Emperor 
Napoleon, established himself, on the 20th 
November, at Brunn, and placed his army 
in concentrated cantonments, in the follow¬ 
ing manner: 

The corps of guards, the grenadiers of 
the reserve, and the troops under Marshal 
Lannes, in Brunn and its vicinity. The ca¬ 
valry under Prince Murat, on the right and 
left of the great road, between Brunn and 
Posorsitz. Marshal Soult, at Austerlitz; 
and the three divisions, of which his army 
was composed, were divided, between that 
place, Butschowitz, Neuwieslitz, Stanitz, 
and the road to Hungary. At Gaja, was 
a strong detachment, which kept open the 


32 


communication with that which observed 
the river March, in order to secure the 
right of the army.* 


* Note by a French officer .—This disposition, of which 
the Austrian officer makes mention, and which is accurate, 
shews that the emperor had foreseen, that the enemy 
might manoeuvre on the line of operation from Olmutz, 
along the March ; in this case, the Russian army' must 
pass at Shadish, whence it was farther distant than Marshal 
Soult, who had some infantry at Gaja, and detachments 
of cavalry, observing all the route, necessary to this 
movement. 

Whenever the enemy’s movement had been known, 
they would have been allowed to advance. The corps 
of Marshals Mortier and Davoust, would have been 
at Goeding, and the enemy would have had 30,000 
men to contend with more than at Austerlitz. 

In all the enemy’s manoeuvres upon Vienna, he 
moved upon the wings of the French army, which, 
by calling in all its detachments, concentrated itself, 
and opposed its whole force to that of the enemy. 

It is more particularly in discussing, what it was 
possible for the enemy to have done, that we are con- 



33 


The 25th November, the Grand Duke 
Constantine arrived at Olmutz, with the 
corps of guards, of which he had the com¬ 
mand. After a long and forced march 
from St. Petersburgh, this fine body of men 
was in the best order. 

This corps w^as composed of ten batta¬ 
lions, and eighteen squadrons, the whole 
amounting to 10,000 men ; of whom, how¬ 
ever, there were only 8,500 under arms. At 
this moment, the army, under M. de Kou- 
tousoff may be computed to have amount¬ 
ed, in all, to above 80,000 men, as will be 
seen hereafter, in detail. 


vinced of the science, and deep calculation shewn 
by the emperor, in a country so new, and so * little 
known. We see that all his dispositions, even those 
which appeared to be the most trivial, and to have 
had no other object in view than the subsistence of 
the troops, were the result of premeditated design, 
the chances of which had been already calculated. 


C 



A reinforcement of 10,000 men was still 
expected, under General Essen ; which, ac¬ 
cordingly, arrived near Olmutz, at the mo¬ 
ment when the allied army commenced its 
offensive operations. The corps of Essen 
was at Kremsir, the day of the battle of 
Austerlitz, and was of no kind of use. The 
army under M. de Koutousoff, was certainly 
stronger than the one opposed to it; but 
while the latter was concentrated towards a 
single point, and formed into masses, the 
former diffused its force as it advanced. 
It is not in numbers that the only, and, in¬ 
deed, the principal strength of an army con¬ 
sists ; but there are emergencies, and occa¬ 
sions, in which it is absolutely necessary to 
profit by that advantage; and the present 
was an instance of the kind. The allied 
army was under the necessity of advancing, 
for the reasons hereafter to be detailed. 
Had it commenced its movement from the 
day svhen the Grand Duke Constantine ar- 


35 


rived with his reinforcement, forming the 
reserve of the centre. If, at this epoch, it 
had manoeuvred with rapidity> and calcu¬ 
lation ; if the reserve, under the Grand 
Duke, had been augmented by the corps 
under General Essen; if less importance had 
been attached to the resting an army, which, 
after some days inactivity., could no longer 
be fatigued; there might, perhaps, have been 
found means, without risking a battle, to 
oblige the French to abandon their posi¬ 
tion, by turning one of its flanks ; which, 
by giving this army some uneasiness, as to 
its communications, would have induced it 
to move upon Vienna, or Bohemia. The 
former step would have been attended with 
danger. The corps of Bernadotte, which 
came from Iglau to reinforce the army in 
front of Brunn, the evening before the bat¬ 
tle of Austerlitz, would not then have had 
time to make this movement, which was 
followed by such fatal consequences to the 
c 2 


36 


allies.* It was only by means such as these, 
had the allies acted with prudence and vi¬ 
gour, that they could have hoped to make 
the French fall into their combinations ^ 
combinations which should have been 
calmly conceived, and vigorously executed. 
But the Quarter-master general, it has be¬ 
fore been mentioned, though an officer of 
great personal courage, had not that confi¬ 
dence in himself which could enable him 
to give advice at the head quarters, where 
the greatest degree of wisdom was requisite. 
Without regarding the difficulties thrown in 
his way, this officer, too easily, abandoned 
his own opinions, to adopt those of other 
people. 

The astonishing rapidity with which the 
unfortunate events, of this disastrous war, 


* Note by a French. Officer .—There is here the mis¬ 
take of a day. Marshal Bernadotte arrived two days be¬ 
fore the battle of Austerlitz. 



37 


succeeded each other; the excessive folly of 
Mack, which was only to be surpassed by 
his disgrace ; and in which originated that 
succession of guilty errors, which astonished 
Europe, and calumniated a brave army; 
that folly of never anticipating a check, 
and of not establishing magazines in the 
rear, as a consequence of that presumption. 
To these circumstances it was owing, that 
the army, while in the position of Olmutz, 
was almost destitute of provisions. It had 
only been there one day, before it was 
obliged to have recourse to forced requisi¬ 
tions ; a violent expedient, which, by the 
disorderly manner in which it was executed, 
had much influence on the discipline of the 
army, into which a spirit of licentiousness 
began to insinuate itself from that day for¬ 
wards. In the then state of politics, the 
gaining time was, at that moment, nearly 
of equal importance with the gaining a bat¬ 
tle : and, the instant it was decided, not to 


38 


manoeuvre, it became of the highest im¬ 
portance to be enabled to subsist in the 
position of Olmutz, for the purpose of main¬ 
taining it. There still remained countries, 
from whence it would have been possible to 
draw provisions; but they were at a dis¬ 
tance, and the convoys were obliged to 
make a long circuit. To this it was neces¬ 
sary to apply a speedy remedy. The offi¬ 
cers of the commissariat received orders, in¬ 
cessantly repeated, but never sufficiently 
urgent, to establish convoys of provisions, 
with all possible dispatch, upon the differ¬ 
ent roads; but some of this department 
wanted both activity and inclination ; their 
systematic conception of things not allow¬ 
ing them to feel the extent of the emergen¬ 
cy ; while others experienced great embar¬ 
rassment, from the detention, by the Rus¬ 
sians, of a great part of the horses belonging 
to the country, which were employed in the 
transport of provisions, and were, in conse- 


2 


39 


quence, at a loss for the means of convey¬ 
ance. The bread was plundered on the 
road, both by the detachments appointed 
for its escort, and by a number of maraud¬ 
ers who followed the army. The strict dis¬ 
cipline, that ought to have existed, was not 
vigourously maintained, under the pretext, 
that the army was starving. Relaxation of 
discipline is always succeeded by excesses ; 
and the licentiousness, attendant upon it, 
gives full latitude to the disaffected, and to 
all those who have not courage to support 
the numerous privations attendant upon 
modern warfare. It was thought impossi¬ 
ble to subsist the army in the position in 
frorit of Olmutz, and it was resolved to 
abandon it, for the purpose of attacking 
the enemy. 


40 


Offensive Movements of the Allied Army, 

We have already seen the uncertainty in 
which M. de Koutousoff found himself, as 
to the movements and force of the enemy, 
at the moment when it was decided to re¬ 
sume the offensive. The accounts derived 
from the people of the country were con¬ 
tradictory ; and the out-posts gave no infor¬ 
mation whatever. The first disposition 
made for the advance, was not then founded 
upon an exact knowledge both of the posi¬ 
tion of the enemy and the numbers to be 
contended with, but was solely adapted to 
the nature of the ground, between Olmutz 
and Wischau. This disposition was given 
to the generals, the 24th November. The 
25th was the day on which it was fixed to 
march; but it was necessary to take two 
days provisions ; and these provisions could 
not arrive till the day after. When that 


41 


day came, some of the generals had not 
sufficiently studied their dispositions; and 
thus, another day was lost. The enemy -»A 
profited by this time. The evening before 
the battle, as has been already mentioned. 
Marshal Bernadotte, as well as part of the 
corps of Marshal Davoust, reinforced the 
Emperor Napoleon. It was necessary to 
recal the attention to these facts, on which 
we shall yet have occasion still further to 
remark. 

The 27th November, at eight o'clock in 
the morning, the army was put in motion, 
in five columns, to approach nearer the ad¬ 
vanced guard, under Prince Bagration, 
who, on that day, made no movement 
whatever, in order that the manoeuvre 
might be concealed from the enemy. This 
was done with a view to concentrating the 
troops, which, however, in the, end, were 
diffused afresh, The five roads, by which 
the army advanced, were parallel to each 


42 


other. The two right columns marched 
along the foot of the mountains, to the 
right of the causeway, and were composed 
of infantry only. That of the centre was on 
the great road to Prosnitz ; the fourth to 
the left of this, and very little distant from 
it; the fifth, composed entirely of cavalry, 
was in sight of the fourth. In front of this 
last, the country was entirely open. 

Here follows the detail of the march. 


RIGHT WING. 


The General of Infantry, Buxhoevden. 


FIRST COLUMN. 

Lieutenant General Wimpfen. 

Major Generals Muller, Sclichow, and Strick. 
18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers, 
squadrons of Cosacks. 

8^3210 men. 250 horses. 


43 


SECOND COLUMN. 

Lieutenant General Langeron. 

Major Generals Kaminsky,. Alsufieu. 

18 battalions of Russians. 1 company of pioneers. 

2-i- squadrons of Cosacks. 

11,420 men. 250 horses. 

CENTRE. 

The General in Chief, Koutousoff. 

THIRD COLUMN. 

Lieutenant General Przybyszewsky. 

Major Generals Orosow, Lieders, Lewis, 

24 battalions of Russians. 

2 companies of reserve artillery. 

13,800 men. 

LEFT WING. 

The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince John de Liech¬ 
tenstein. 


44 


FOURTH COLUMN. 

The Austrian Lieutenant General Kollowrath. 

The Russian Lieutenant Generals Essen and Milorado- 
wich. 

The Russian Major Generals Szepelovv and Repninsky. 
The Austrian Major Generals Carneville, Rottermunde, 
and Jurezeck. 

32 battalions, of which 20 were Austrians. 

1 company of reserve artillery. 

5 companies of pioneers. 

30 squadrons of Russians, of which 8 were Cosacks. 
22,400 men. 3000 horses. 

FIFTH COLUMN. 

The Austrian Lieutenant General Prince Hobenlohe. 
The Russian Lieutenant General Ouwarow. 

The Austrian Major Generals Stutterheim, Weber, and 
Caramelli. 

The Russian Major General Piritzky. 

70 squadrons, of which 40 were Austrian, but very 
weak. 

2 companies of light artillery, 

4600 horses. 


45 


THE RESERVE. 

The Grand Duke Constantine. 
Lieutenant Generals Kollagriwoff and Malutin. 
Major Generals Jankewitz and Depleradowich. 
10 battalions of guards, 4 companies. 

IS squadrons. 

8,500 men. 


RECAPITULATION. 


1st and 2nd columns. 

36 

bat. 2 comp. 5 squad. 

19,740 

3d do. 

24 

-2 — 

— 

13,800 

4th and 5th do. 

32 

-8 — 

— 100-- 

27,000 

Reserve 

10 

-4 — 

— 18- 

8,500 

Advanced corps under 


# 



Prince Bagration 

12 


o 

1 

1 

12,000 

General Kienmayer 


- 

— 14 -- 

1,000 

114- 

-16 

-177 -1 82,040 


# 15 of these were Cosacks. 

f Note by a French officer. —It is evident that the author 
here diminishes the real strength of the combined army, 
by one-fifth 










46 


The first column assembled at Nebotin, 
and marched upon Trzebschein, Blumenau, 
and Kobelnizeck, where it formed in two 
lines. 

The second column assembled at Olschan, 
and marched upon Studnitz, Czechowitz, 
and Ottaslowitz, where it formed, with its 
right supported by the left of the first 
column. 

The third column assembled on the high 
road to Prosnitz, on which it marched, 
and formed in line with the two right co¬ 
lumns. 

The fourth column* assembled at Ned- 


* Note by the Austrian general .—The Austrian battalions, 
of which this column was partly composed, were extremely 
weak, in consequence of the new formation introduced 
by M. Mack, who, from three battalions to each regi¬ 
ment, made five: and> as before stated, they were new 
levies, with the exception of the regiment of Salzbourg, 



47 


wriss, and marched upon Wrahowitz, and 
Dobrochow, where it formed, and esta¬ 
blished its communication with the centre 
column. 

The fifth column assembled at Schabelin, 
and marched upon Kralitz, and Brzesowitz, 
where it formed in two lines. 

This last column, not being covered by 
the out-posts on the left, had an advanced 
guard of its own, commanded by General 


and the frontier troops. This corps of infantry was com* 
posed as follows: 

13 


2 bat. lstreg. of Szeckler. 
2 do. 2d do. 

1 do. Brooder 
6 do. Salzbourg. 

1 do. Auersperg. 

1 do. Kaunitz. 


1 bat. reg. of Lindenau. 

1-Kerpen. 

1---Beaulieu. 

X --Wurtembourg. 

1-Reuss. Grailz. 

1-Czar to risky. 

X--Kaiser. 


13 


20 









48 


Stutterheim, which communicated with the 
detachments observing the river March. 

The army advanced with much precau¬ 
tion, because it was ignorant of the enemy's 
movements. It had orders to refuse the 
left, and to allow the right, which moved 
along* the mountains, to gain ground, in 
order to turn the enemy’s left, in case of 
meeting with it. The corps under the 
Grand Duke marched upon Prosnitz, (where 
the two emperors and the head-quarters 
were established) and formed the reserve. 
After four hours march, the army arrived 
on its different points of formation without 
any obstacle. 

Information was received that the enemy 
had made no movement whatever, and that 
his advanced guard at Wischau had neither 
been reinforced or diminished. Prepara¬ 
tions were in consequence made for its 
attack the next morning, and Prince Ba¬ 
gration received orders to put it in execu- 


49 


tion. The army was to follow, in the same 
order as before, the route that should be 
opened for it by this general. On the 28th, 
at day-break, Prince Bagration put his 
corps in motion, in three columns; that of 
the centre remained on the causeway; the 
two others, on the right and left, turned the 
town of Wischau; in which the enemy had 
a regiment of hussars, and one of chas¬ 
seurs. Two other regiments of cavalry 
were posted in reserve, in rear of the 
town; while General Sebastiani was at 
Huluboschan with a regiment of dragoons. 
As soon as the Russians, with the cavalry 
under General Kienmayer (composed of 
the hussars of Szechler and Hesse Ilom- 
bourg) on their left, appeared before Wis¬ 
chau, and on the heights of Brindlitz, the 
French cavalry, with the exception of about 
100 men, precipitately abandoned the 
town. 

The Adjutant General Dolgorucky, took 

D 


50 


possession of ttie town with two Battalions 
of Infantry, and made four officers and 
100 men prisoners. The Enemy’s Cavalry 
received considerable reinforcements in re¬ 
tiring upon Rausnitz, where was a strong 
Reserve. In the first instance, they were 
pursued by four squadrons of Russian 
Hussars, and two of Cosacks; but after¬ 
wards all the cavalry under Prince Bagra¬ 
tion, reinforced by that of the fourth co¬ 
lumn, under the command of Lieutenant 
General Essen, (under whose orders were 
placed ten squadrons of Hulans, five of 
Cuirassiers, five of Dragoons, and eight of 
Cosacks) passed through Wischau, to sup¬ 
port the attack of the advanced guard. 
To cover his right during this movement, 
Prince Bagration had received orders to 
send a regiment of chasseurs, and one of 
cavalry, to the right of Drissitz by Busto- 
mirz and Dietitz, upon Habrowan. This 
general prosecuted his march as far as the 


51 


heights of Rausnitz, where he took up his 
position. The enemy was still master of this 
little town, and began to cannonade,; but 
the Russian artillery, which was more nu¬ 
merous, soon silenced the fire. In the 
evening, two Russian Battalions took pos-* 
session of Rausnitz, in front of which were 
placed the out-posts. 

M. de Kienmayer, who, with his cavalry, 
had supported the Russian advanced guard 
on the left, took his direction upon Draso- 
witz, and there established his communica¬ 
tion with Prince Bagration. 

The army, on the 28th, moved, as before, 
in five columns, and followed up the move¬ 
ment of the advanced guard, in the follow¬ 
ing manner : 

The first column, from Kobelnizech, by 
Ratzlawitz, upon Lutsch, where it took up 
its position, posting six Battalions of Infant¬ 
ry and Chasseurs, in the wood between Nq- 
majam a*nd Pistomirtz. 

d 2 



52 


The second column, from Ottaslowitz, by 
Dietitz, upon Nosalowitz, where it formed 
in second line. 

The third column, marched as before, 
along the causeway, to beyond Noska: one 
brigade was posted in the first, and the two 
others in second line. 

The fourth column, from Dobrochow, by 
Krziczanowitz, and Brindlitz, upon the 
heights of Noska, where two regiments* 
formed in first line ; and the two others in 
second line. The Austrian infantry attach¬ 
ed to this column was formed in two lines, 
on the left of the Russians. 

The fifth column, from Brzesowitz, by 
Ewanowitz, upon Topolan: its advanced 
guard marched upon Kutscherau, and com¬ 
municated witli that at Drasowitz. 

Upon these movements of the allies, the 


# I am inclined to think the word, regiment has here 
been, inadvertently, substituted for brigade. Translator, 



53 


French quitted their cantonments. By a 
signal made from Austerlitz, Marshal Soult 
collected his corps there, which evacuated 
the villages it had before occupied. 

The allies flattered themselves that the 
enemy would not risk the fate of a battle in 
front of Brunn. After the 28th, this hope 
became the prevailing opinion at head quar¬ 
ters. Then, instead of hastening their move¬ 
ments, they wished to manoeuvre, at a pe¬ 
riod, when too much had been risked, to 
enable them to avoid a decisive action ; if, 
contrary to the opinion of those who 
thought the French would not fight, they 
still persisted in not retiring. 

We have, hitherto, seen M. de KoutousofF 
advancing his right, and refusing his left, 
with the view of turning the enemy's flank 
by the mountains; for which purpose he 
had disposed the greater part of hife infantry 
on the right wing. At Wischau this dispo¬ 
sition was changed. He wished to manceu- 


54 


yre Oti the right of the enemy. A march to 
the left was undertaken, which both lost 
time, and the ground that might have been 
gained to the front. The 29th November, 
the combined army moved from Lultsch, 
and the heights fc>f Moska, upon those of 
Huluboschan and Kutscherau. It was not 
till the 1st December that Marshals Berna¬ 
dette and Davoust joined the Emperor Na¬ 
poleon $ and, on the 29th, M. de Koutou- 
soff might have been at Austerlitz. After 
having passed V» ischau, the allied army 
could no longer manoeuvre with impunity. 
The time it then lost, in making move¬ 
ments, which did not lead it directly to¬ 
wards the enemy, while it discovered its 
intentions to the French army, gave it 
also the means of receiving such reinforce¬ 
ments as were within reach. A short flank 
movement could not answer the end pro¬ 
posed; while one that was longer , would 


55 


have afforded the enemy an opportunity of 
attacking on the march. 

While the army was moving on the 
heights of Kutscherau, Prince Bagration 
pushed on his advanced posts towards Pos- 
orsitz: General Kienmayer marched upon 
Austerlitz, which the enemy had evacuated 
at ten o'clock,* on the morning of the 2-th; 
and General Stutterheim arrived at Buts- 
chowitz, from whence lie kept up the com¬ 
munication by Stanitz, with a detachment 
under Lieutenant Colonel Scheither, who 
had driven the enemy's detachments front 
Gaja. The French army concentrated its 
forces, the same day, between Turas and 


* Note by a French officer .—The corps under Marshal 
Soult had evacuated Austerlitz at three o’clock in the 
morning; and was posted at seven o’clock in rear of 
Puntowitz and Schlapanitz. There are sotne iuaccura* 
cies in the detail of the movements, and the partial at¬ 
tacks ; tuj; tke narrative is generally correct, and well, 
told. 



56 


Brunn : it occupied the villages ot Menitz, 
Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, Kobelnitz, and Schlapa- 
nitz, which covered its front, and placed its 
out-posts at Aujest, on the heights of Gir- 
shikowitz, and near Krug. The 30 th No¬ 
vember, the combined army, in conse¬ 
quence of its new plan, again marched to 
its left, in the following manner: 

• The first column, from Kutscherau, by 
Lettonitz, upon Niemschan, which was the 
appuy for the right; its left was at Hodie- 
gitz, and it was disposed in two lines. 

The second column, by Lettonitz, to Ho- 
diegitz, where it formed on the left of the 
first column. 

The third column, upon Malkowi z, by 
Butschowitz, and Krzisanowitz, where it 
was posted in reserve, in rear of the first 
column. 

The fourth column, by Schardiska, Tsch- 
ertschein, Krzizanowitz, upom lierspitz, 


57 

where it formed in reserve to the second 
column. 

The fifth column, by Neuwieslitz, follow¬ 
ed the inarch of the third, and was posted 
in the valley, in front of Marhoefen. 

The Reserve, ui*der the Archduke Con¬ 
stantine, marched to Butschowitz ; the ad¬ 
vanced corps, under Prince Bagration, to 
Posorsitz; and pushed on its out-posts upon 
the causeway, and upon Krug. M. de 
Kienmayer remained at Austerlitz, and was 
reinforced by the brigade under General 
Stutterheim. A little affair of out-posts 
took place that day; the enemy was em¬ 
ployed in reconnoitring, and a few cannon 
shots were ineffectually exchanged. The 
head-quarters of M. de Koutousoff were at 
Iiodiegitz; those of the two Emperors at 
Krzizanowitz, near Austerlitz. 

It is here necessary to remark, that du¬ 
ring these offensive movements the Arch¬ 
duke Ferdinand had received orders to ad- 


58 


vance also, to make a di version and occupy 
the enemy ; and that this prince, quitting 
Czaslau, after having driven the Bavarians, 
first from Steinsdorff and afterwards from 
Deutschbrod, was advancing upon Xglau, 
where the Bavarian general, De Wrede, had 
the command. 

On the 1st December, there was a good 
deal of firing, the whole of the morning, 
along the entire chain of out-posts. The 
enemy, from day-break in the morning, was 
continually reconnoitring along the heights 
in front of Pratzeo and Krug. He also, for 
the like purpose, pushed parties from his 
left to be} T ond the high road. M. de Kien- 
mayer's out-posts, on the left, were at 
Satchan : and he had a post near Menitz, 
a village which the French abandoned. 
Five Battalions of frontier troops, under 
Major-general Carneviile, being a part of 
the Austrian infantry, arrived in the evening 
to reinforce M. de Kienruayer, 


The combined army, the left of which 
was commanded by General Buxhoevden, 
and the centre by the general-in-chief, 
after having dined, moved forwards, in five 
columns, in the following manner: 

The first column, under Lieutenant-Gen¬ 
eral Dochtorow, composed of tweujy-four 
Battalions of Russians, marched by its left 
on Herspit z, Wachan, Klein-Hostieradeck, 
and took up a position in two lines, on the 
heights where this village is situated. A re¬ 
giment of Chasseurs was posted at Aujest, 
a village between the foot of the mountain 
and the lakes of Menitz. 

The second column, commanded by 
Lieutenant-general Langeron, composed of 
eighteen Battalions of Russians, marched 
by Austerlitz, Krzenowitz, and took up a 
position on the heights of Pratzen ; also in 
two lines on the right of the first column. 

The third column, commanded by Lieu¬ 
tenant-General Przybyszewsky, composed 


60 


of eighteen Battalions of Russians, march¬ 
ed on the right of Austerlitz, took its direc¬ 
tion upon Pratzen, and its position on the 
heights, to the right of this village. 

The fourth column, commanded by the 
Austrian Lieutenant-general Kollovvrath, 
was composed of twelve Battalions of Rus¬ 
sians, under Lieutenant-general Milorado- 
witsch, and of fifteen of Austrians, who 
were in the rear of this column. This lat¬ 
ter marched by its right, near Niemschan, 
intersected the high road from Austerlitz to 
Brunn, and took post in two lines, in rear 
of the third column. 

The fifth column, composed of cavalry, 
under the orders of Lieutenant-general 
Prince John, of Liechtenstein, was compo¬ 
sed of eighty-two squadrons, marched by 
its left, and followed the direction of the 
third column, behind which it took post 
under the heights. 

The corps of reserve, under the Grand 


61 


Duke Constantine, composed of ten Bat¬ 
talions, and eighteen squadrons of guards, 
passed by Austerlitz, and posted itself on 
the heights in front, with its left towards 
Krzenowitz, and its right towards the high 
road from Austerlitz to Brunn. 

The advanced corps, under Prince Bagra¬ 
tion, extended by its left beyond Holubitz 
and Blasowitz, in order to facilitate the 
inarch of the third and fourth columns up¬ 
on their points of formation. 

Lieutenant-general Kienmayer, as soon 
as the columns arrived on the heights, in 
front of Austerlitz and Krzenowitz, where 
his troops were posted, marched by Prat- 
zen, in front of Aujest, where he arrived at 
nine o'clock at night: his corps was then 
composed of twenty-two squadrons of Aus¬ 
trians, ten of Cosacks, and five Battalions 
of Croats. 

The head-quarters were at Krzenowitz. 
The enemy did not interrupt this move- 


ment, and even withdrew his out-posts as 
far as Tellnitz, Sokolnitz and Sehlapanitz. 
The second column having arrived late on 
its point of formation, had no out-posts in 
its front. During the whole night there was 
no chain of out-posts established in front of 
the position occupied by the combined army. 

At one moment during the night, the ene¬ 
my evacuated the village of Tellnitz, in 
which out-posts were placed by a half 
squadron of Austrian light cavalry of the 
regiment of 0‘Reilly : but two hours after, 
the French returned in force, and posted a 
regiment of infantry in this village, from 
the division of Legrand, forming a part of 
the right of Marshal Soult. The out-posts 
on the left of the allies sent, continually, 
patroles during the night, to their right, in 
order to establish a communication with the 
Russian advanced posts, but could never 
fall in with them. 


63 

This offensive movement had been made 
by the army in open day, and in sight of 
the enemy, who, from the heights of Schla- 
panitz, and in front of Kobelnitz, had been 
able to remark it at his ease. The position 
occupied by the allies, at the moment when 
they crowned the heights between Aujest, 
Pratzen, and Holubitz, was a strong one: 
The enemy, had he been well observed, 
would have found it difficult to advance 
for the purpose of attacking these heights;* 


* Note by a French officer .—There is no foundation 
for the re hi ark here made by the Austrian officer; since 
the Emperor, who intended to act upon the centre of the 
enemy, had an interest in remaining master of these de¬ 
files, that no obstacle might be opposed to the bnng- 
ino- his army into action ? it was with this view he oc¬ 
cupied the fine position of the Santon, situated in front 
of all the small streams: besides, the Emperor had posts 
upon these rivulets two days before ; and the left of the 
French army was between the Santon and the village of 
Qirshikowitz, which was the rendezvous of almost the 




64 


The defiles of Tellnitz, Sokolnitz, and Schl- 
apanitz, which separated the two armies, 


whole cavalry; consequently, from that moment, it was 
no longer necessary to pass the defiles in order to attack 
the heights. 

This observation of the Austrian officer, only serves to 
mark more strongly to every French officer, who was a 
witness of the affair, both the prudence and military eye 
of their general. He made the Santon, the point of 
appuy, for his left flank ; not because it was a fine de¬ 
fensive position ; there were others in the rear equally 
good ; but, because it was the key to all offensive opera¬ 
tions. If, on the contrary, the French general had neg¬ 
lected the Santon, the whole of the left wing of the 
French army would have been prevented from resuming 
the offensive, unless they passed the defiles. 

Eight days before the battle, the Emperor returning 
from Wischau, ascended the Santon, notwithstanding the 
extreme cold ; and said to the officers about him : “ Ex¬ 
amine this position well; it will probably play a conspi¬ 
cuous part before two months are over our heads/’ 

The Emperor having always had it in view, during 
the campaign in Moravia, not to allow his left to be 
turned, and to abandon his right; that alone would have 
2 



65 


offered the means of delay; and the very 
elevated points of these heights afforded 
strong means of defence. Here, as in the 
position, in front of Olmutz, the army was 
posted on a curtain, behind which massive 
columns might be posted, ready to act of¬ 
fensively. Its left was secured by the lakes 
of Menitz and Aujest, while the right was 
refqsed. But the taking advantage of this 
position was never thought of, any more 
than the possibility of being attacked on 
these heights, or of finding the enemy on 
this side the defile. The French emperor 
took advantage, in a masterly manner, of 
the faults that were committed. He kept 


been a sufficient reason for resting his left on a posi¬ 
tion not defensive, but offensive, such as was that of 
the Santon. The fact is, the more we discuss the plan 
of the campaign, the more we perceive the judgment 
and military eye of a master in the science of war, 

E 



66 


his troops concentrated in massive columns, 
ready to act according to circumstances. 
Marshal Bernadotte (who had joined the 
Emperor Napoleon the day on which the 
allies shewed themselves on the heights of 
Pratzen), had been posted in the first in¬ 
stance to the left of the high road. In the 
night the Emperor caused his corps to pass 
this road, and posted it in rear of the vil¬ 
lage of Girschikowitz, which was occupied 
in force. This corps, composed of the di¬ 
visions of Rivaux and Drouet, formed the 
centre of the French army. Prince Murat's 
cavalry was in rear of Marshal Bernadotte, 
a'nd on his left. Marshal Lannes formed 
the left wing with the divisions of Suchet 
and Caffarelli; this last was connected with 
the left of Prince Murat. The right of the 
army, commanded by Marshal Soult, was 
placed between Kobelnitz and Sokolnitz; 
the division of Legrand forming the extreme 
right, was posted between Sokolnitz and 


6 ? 


Tellnitz, and occupied these villages with 
strong detachments of Infantry. The divi¬ 
sion of Vandamme was on the left, and the 
division of St. Hilaire in the centre of Mar¬ 
shal Soult's corps. 

The reserve of the army, composed of 
ten Battalions of the imperial guard, and of 
ten Battalions of General Oudinot's corps, 
the whole commanded by General Duroc, 
was near Turas. The division of Eriant, 
belonging to the corps under Marshal Da- 
voust, which had just arrived from Pres- 
burg, was sent to the convent of Reygern, 
on the Schwartza, to observe and keep the 
enemy in check, should he approach by the 
route of Auspitz. The division of General 
Gudin (also arrived from Presburg), with 
&ome dragoons belonging to Marshal Da- 
voust’s corps, advanced from Nickolsbourg, 
on the right of the French army, to keep in 
check the corps of M. de Merveldt ,who had 
penetrated through Hungary to Lunden- 
e C Z 


63 


bourg. This general had with him his own 
regiment of Hulans, and the Emperors 
hussars, much weakened by the losses they 
had sustained during a difficult retreat; 
and six Battalions of infantry, also very 
weak ; the whole amounting to little more 
than 4,000 men. A detachment of O'Reil¬ 
ly's light cavalry, and some Cossacks, were 
sent to Gros-Niemschitz to observe that 
point. 

We have now given the position of both 
armies, during the night between the 1st 
and 2nd December, which immediately 
preceded this ever-memorable day. 


BATTLE OF AUSTERLITZ. 


The disposition for the attack of the 
French army was delivered to the general 
officers of the Austro-Russian army, soon 
after midnight, on the morning of the 2nd 
December. But the imperfect knowledge 
that was possessed of their position, al¬ 
though scarcely out of range of the enemy's 
musketry, naturally made the suppositions 
upon which the disposition of attack was 
founded also very indefinite. Some move- 




70 


merits had been remarked, the evening be¬ 
fore, on the enemy's left, but it was not 
known to be occasioned by the arrival of 
the corps under Marshal Bernadotte.* It 


* Note by a French officer ,—Marshal Bernadotte was 
never seen till the day of the battle. Trm days before he 
had rested on his arms behind Brunn, and the following 
day he took post in the rear of the army, near Lattein. 
The French generals object in this disposition was, not 
only to avoid fatiguing this corps as much as possible, 
but also, not to pass the defile of Bellowitz; for not in¬ 
tending to risk an action, unless the enemy committed 
great errors, he had determined on retiring another 
day’s march to the rear, if the enemy manoeuvred with 
skill. It was not his wish to engage a general action with 
a superior army, if it were well posted. The victory 
might have been doubtful, and above all, too destruc¬ 
tive. 

It was, therefore, that the divisions repassed the defiles, 
each day in proportion as the enemy’s plans became appa¬ 
rent, and the faults he was about to commit became more 
probable. Besides, if instead of turning the right of 
the French army, (which was what the French general 




71 


was supposed that the French army was 
weakening its centre to reinforce its left. 
Several lines of smoke, which had also 
been perceived the evening before, between 


rather wished) the Russians had brought on an affair 
among the mountains, by turning the left. The position 
of the head-quarters, behind Kritchen, (which was always 
occupied by the French) was the point, from whence, by 
a wheel to the left, it was the most easy to move diagonally 
in rear of the Santon, upon the little hills towards the 
left. 

The movement that may have been seen on our left, was 
nothing else than the posting the divisions of Suchet and 
Caffarelli to support the Santon, because it was appre¬ 
hended the enemy might, in the course of the day, at¬ 
tempt to get possession of that height, which was the 
key to the emperor’s projects. He would not allow the 
enemy to occupy positions too near to Girshikowitz and 
Puntowitz, which might have prevented the army from 
forming. For the attack, which had been planned by the 
emperor, particularly depended on the rapidity with 
which the centre should march on the heights of Prat- 


gen. 



72 


Turas and the lakes in rear of Sokolnitz, 
and Kobelnitz, and some others near Czer- 
nowitz, caused the belief that the French 
army had made these lakes the point of 
appuy for their right, and had placed a re¬ 
serve in the real*. The left of the com¬ 
bined army outflanked the right of the 
French army. It was supposed, that by 
passing the defile of Sokolnitz, and of Ko¬ 
belnitz, their right would be turned, and 
and that the attack might afterwards be 
continued in the plain, between Schlapa- 
nitz and the wood of Turas, thus avoiding 
the defiles of Schlapanitz and Bellowitz, 
which, it was believed, covered the front of 
the enemy's position. The French army was 
then to be attacked by its right flank, upon 
which it was intended to move down large 
bodies of troops; this movement was to be 
executed with celerity and vigour; the valley 
between Tellnitz and Sokolnitz was to be 
passed with rapidity; the right of the allies 


73 


(on which was the cavalry of Prince John 
de Liechtenstein, and the advanced corps 
under Prince Bagration) was to cover this 
movement.—The first of these generals on 
the plain between Krug and Schlapanitz, 
on each side of the causeway; and the 
other by protecting the cavalry, and occu¬ 
pying the heights situated between Dwaro- 
schna and the Inn of Lesch, with his artil¬ 
lery.* For this purpose, the five columns, 


* Note by a French officer .—This plan was faulty in 
every point of view. Supposing the emperor not to have 
attacked the heights of Pratzen, merely keeping possession 
of the Santon, and the village of Girshikowitz, he would 
have made an effort in the centre, when the enemy at¬ 
tacked him, and the left of the enemy, once arrived at 
the wood of Turas, was by that divided from his centre. 

All this serves to prove, that many men are capable of 
manoeuvring 15 or 20,000 men, but very few knowhow 
to derive all the possible advantage from an army of 


80,000. 



? 4 


composed as before, received orders to ad¬ 
vance in the following manner: 

1st. Column. Lieut.-general Dochtorow, 
with 24 Battalions of Russians, 
from the heights of Hostieradeck, 
by Aujest, upon Tellnitz. After 
having passed the village and defile, 
the column was to move forward 
to the right upon the lakes, till its 
head became parallel with that of 
the 2d column. 

2nd Column. Lieut.-general Langeron, 
with 18 Battalions of Russians, 
marching like the former column, 
by his left from the heights of 
Pratzen, was to force the valley 
between Sokolnitz and Tellnitz, 
and then dress by the 1st column. 
3rd Column. Lieut.-general Przybyszew- 
sky, with 18 Battalions of Russians, 
was also to move by his left, from 


75 


the heights to the right of Pratzen, 
close by the castle of Sokolnitz; 
from whence the heads of the three 
columns were to move forward, be¬ 
tween Sokolnitz and the lakes situ¬ 
ated behind it, as far as the lakes 
of Kobelnitz. 

4th Column. Lieut.-general Kollowrath, 
with 27 Battalions, 15 of which 
were Austrian, moving forward by 
his left, from the heights in rear of 
the 3d column, was to pass the 
same valley, and the lakes of Ko¬ 
belnitz, and bring the head of his 
column parallel with that of the 
three former. 

The advanced corps under M. Kienmayer, 
was to protect, with its infantry, 
the movements of the 1st column, 
so that this last was, in fact, rein¬ 
forced by five Austrian Battalions, 
and composed altogether of 29 Bat- 


76 


talions. The heads of these four 
columns of infantry were to present 
a large front, and four Battalions 
of the 1st column were to occupy 
the wood of Turas. The remainder, 
and all the other columns, were 
then to move forward between this 
wood and Schlapanitz, and to at¬ 
tack the right of the enemy with 
strong bodies of infantry, while 
three Battalions of the fourth co¬ 
lumn should be occupied in carry¬ 
ing the village of Schlapanitz. 

5th Column. Lieut.-general Prince John 
de Liechtenstein, with 82 squa¬ 
drons, was first of all to move from 
the foot of the hill, in rear of the 
3d column, between Blasowitz and 
Krug, to protect the formation and 
march of the columns on the right, 
and afterwards to advance upon 
the plain on the right and left of 


77 


the causeway, between Krug and 
the Inn of Lesch, as was before 
mentioned. 

The advanced corps, under Lieutenant- 
general Prince Bagration, consist¬ 
ing of twelve Battalions and forty 
squadrons, was to maintain its po¬ 
sition, and gain the heights between 
Dwaroschna, and the Inn of Lesch, 
in order to place strong batteries of 
cannon upon them. 

The corps of reserve, under the Grand Duke 
Constantine, consisting of ten Bat¬ 
talions and eighteen squadrons, was 
to move from the heights in front 
of Austerlitz to the rear of Blaso- 
witz and Krug ; he was to serve as 
a support to the cavalry of Prince 
John de Liechtenstein, and to the 
corps under Prince Bagration. 


78 


The fortune of this day was made to de¬ 
pend upon the rapidity of the attack on 
our left, and on the driving back the ene¬ 
my’s right upon his left. It was imagined 
the battle would not be decisive if Prince 
Bagration was not enabled to oppose an 
obstinate resistance to the attacks the 
French might make upon him ; and orders 
were given to the cavalry, under Prince 
John de Liechtenstein, to attack the ene¬ 
my in any movement he might make, with 
a view to engaging this Russian general. 

The cavalry, under Lieutenant-general 
Kienmayer, as soon as the first column 
should have passed the defile of Tellnitz, 
was destined to cover the left of the co¬ 
lumn, and to march between Turas and the 
Schwarza; observing well the convent of 
Reygern. 

It was settled in the disposition, that in 
case the four columns were fortunate enough 
to advance as far as the causew T ay between 


79 


Lattein and Bellowitz, and to drive the ene¬ 
my back into the mountains, the Wood of 
Turas was still to remain occupied by the 
four Battalions destined to this purpose, in 
order to preserve the facility of manoeuvr¬ 
ing round it, and the means of retiring, if 
necessary, by Kobelnitz and Puntowitz 
into the position of Pratzen ; which retreat 
was, in case of the worst, to be continued 
as far as the position of Hodiegitz, Niemt- 
schen, and Herspitz. 

If the attack made by the left proved 
successful, then Prince Bagration was to 
move against the enemy's left, and to esta¬ 
blish a communication with the four co¬ 
lumns of infantry; after which it was in¬ 
tended to unite the army in front of the 
village of Lattein, between Lesch and Nen- 
nowitz. The defiles of Schalapanitz, Bello¬ 
witz and Kritschen, being thus cleared, the 
cavalry under Prince John de Liechten¬ 
stein was to pass them with rapidity, in or- 


80 


der to support the infantry; and, in case of 
success, to pursue the enemy between 
Brunn and Czernowitz. 

The general-in-chief, Koutousoff, was in 
the centre with the fourth column. 

The general of infantry, Buxlioevden, 
commanded the left of the army, and 
marched with the first column. 

Having thus given the plan of attack, 
concerted by the allies, we are now about 
to see the manner in which it was deranged* 
and how it happened that the faults in the 
conception were not compensated for by 
the success of the execution. 

At seven o’clock in the morning the com¬ 
bined army was put in motion, and quitted 
the heights of Pratzen to advance upon its 
given points. Each of the four columns of 
infantry was perfectly in view of the enemy, 
who could not but perceive that the direc¬ 
tion of their march caused considerable 
intervals between them, in proportion as 


81 


the heads of the columns approached the 
valleys of Tellnitz, Sokolnitz and Kobel- 
nitz. The action began on the left wing of 
the allies. The corps of General Kienmay- 
er, posted in front of Aujest, as before men¬ 
tioned, was nearest the enemy, and destined 
to force the defile of Tellnitz, to open the 
route for the first column, which had a 
great circuit to make after having passed 
this defile, in order to arrive at the point 
which would bring it in a line with the se¬ 
cond column ; this made it necessary to 
carry the village of Tellnitz as soon as pos¬ 
sible. Between Aujest and Tellnitz is a 
considerable plain, on which some squad¬ 
rons of hussars were advanced, between se¬ 
ven and eight o’clock, to reconnoitre the 
enemy. On a hill, in front of the village, 
were posted several companies of infantry, 
who defended its approach, while some de¬ 
tachments of cavalry were on the right, ha¬ 
ving the lake of Menitz as their appuy. 




82 


M. de Kienmayer ordered a detachment 
of cavalry to advance against their right, 
and a Battalion* of the first, regiment of 
Szeckler infantry to attack the hill on which 
the French infantry was posted. The lat¬ 
ter was reinforced, and a fire of musketry 
commenced, which became pretty wimn. 
The French defended themselves with ob¬ 
stinacy ; and the Austrians, who had been 


* Many misfortunes of tlie allies appear to have ori- 
ginated in attacking with small corps where they had the 
power of attacking in force. It is obvious, that if one 
Battalion is inadequate to the service on which it is sent, 
it will not only suffer severely in the attempt, but that 
very attempt will apprize the enemy of the intention, and 
enable him to reinforce. Whereas, by at once attack¬ 
ing with numbers, all opposition is borne down, and the 
defence, from not being protracted, is generally less de¬ 
structive to the assailants : wherever the French make an 
attack, it is in force ; and therefore they usually succeed ; 
with the additional advantage, that they are enabled by 
those very numbers to maintain themselves in what they 
have acquired. Translator . 




83 


supported by another Battalion, attacked 
with spirit. The hussars of Hesse Horn- 
bourg, on the right, under Major General 
Nostitz, and those of Szeckler on the left, 
under Major General Prince Maurice 
Liechtenstein, took post on the flanks of' 
this infantry, to check the enemy's cavalry, 
(which was perceived on the farther side of 
the defile of Tellnitz) should it attempt to 
pass for the purpose of attacking these 
Austrian Battalions. The Hussars suffered 
severely from the enemy's sharp shooters, 
who took advantage of the ground, which 
all round the village was covered with vine¬ 
yards, and full of ditches ; but they could 
not succeed in keeping off the cavalry. 
The second Battalion of the regiment of 
Szeckler infantry had arrived to reinforce 
the first, which was attacking the hill, and 
which had lost more than half its strength. 
Twice the Austrians were repulsed; and 
twice they again advanced to the foot of 
r 9 * 


the hill, which it was necessary to carry, in 
order to arrive at the village. At length 
General Stutterheim succeeded in getting 
possession of it v ith these two Battalions. 

The enemy's third regiment of the line, 
and two Battalions of sharp shooters, were 
in possession of Tellnitz and the vineyards 
round the village. .These troops defended 
their post with valour. M. de Kienmayer 
ordered General Carneville to advance with 
the remainder of his infantry (consisting of 
three other Battalions) to the support of the 
two which were on the hill, and were fight¬ 
ing with great conrage. A destructive fire 
of musketry ensued, ihe village was situa¬ 
ted in a natural entrenchment, the vine¬ 
yards being surrounded by a deep ditch, of 
which the French kept possession : however, 
the Austrians succeeded at one time in pe¬ 
netrating as far as the village ; but were 
again repulsed, and had some difficulty in 
maintaining possession of the hill they had 


I, . - 

85 

before carried. The regiment of Szeckler 
infantry fought with the greatest obstinacy ; 
above two-thirds of them being killed or 
wounded. This action had already lasted 
above an hour, and yet the head of the first 
column, with which was M. de Buxhoev- 
den, had not yet made its appearance. 
The French had more troops belonging to 
Legrand's division on the farther side of the 
defile; and the Austrians engaged in so un¬ 
equal a contest (since they were without 
support), continued to make fresh efforts, 
which they momentarily expected would 
become useless. At length, M. de Bux- 
hoevden, with the first column, appeared 
from Aujest, and sent a Battalion of the se¬ 
venth regiment of light infantry to support 
the Austrians, and a brigade of Russians to 
form the reserve. Two Austrian Battalions, 
with this Battalion of light infantry, which 
charged the enemy with impetuosity, at¬ 
tacked the village, gained possession of it. 


86 


and were followed by the remainder. The 
French, on the approach of such superior 
numbers, evacuated the defile, and drew up 
on the farther side in order of battle. M. 
de Buxhoevden, before he moved forward, 
waited to see the head of the second co¬ 
lumn (which was not advancing) appear in 
the plain, between the foot of the hills and 
Sokolnitz. 

Towards nine o'clock the enemy received 
a reinforcement of 4,000 men from the 
corps under General Davoust. These troops 
arrived from the convent of Reygern; the 
French then taking advantage of a thick 
fog which suddenly darkened the whole 
valley, again got possession of the village, 
and even penetrated as far as the hill be¬ 
yond it. At this moment General Nostitz 
made a rapid charge, with two squadrons 
of the hussars of Hesse Hombourg, for the 
purpose of checking them. 


87 


The Russian light infantry, and an Aus¬ 
trian Battalion, which had been posted in 
Tellnitz, had fallen back in disorder: the 
Russian regiment of New Ingermannland 
ought to have supported them; but retreat¬ 
ed in a manner, which, combined with the 
fog, threw a part of the column into confu¬ 
sion. The charge made by the hussars had 
checked the French infantry, some hundreds 
of whom were made prisoners. The fog 
having dispersed, the troops again moved 
forwards, and the enemy abandoned the 
yillage. The first column made a deploy¬ 
ment in several lines upon the hill, and Tell¬ 
nitz was retaken. A cannonade took place; 
and as soon as the French entirely withdrew 
from this point, the defile was passed, with¬ 
out opposition, by the brigades of cavalry 
under Prince Maurice Liechtenstein and 
General Stutterheim, who drew up in order 
of battle on the farther side. Tellnitz and 
the defile were occupied by some Battalions 


88 


provided with artillery. The enemy then 
entirely abandoned the plain between Tell- 
nitz and Turas ; but he was not followed 
up, because the communication with the 
second column was not yet established. 
The Austrian cavalry consequently avoided 
the snare laid for it, by the retreat of the 
right of the French army. During this ac¬ 
tion, near Tellnitz, the second and third 
column had quitted the heights of Pratzen, 
and had approached towards Sokolnitz, 
which was occupied by two Battalions 
from the division of Legrand. These two 
Battalions opposed some resistance to the 
Russian light infantry as they advanced at 
the head of these columns. The French had 
placed some cannon on a hill between Sok¬ 
olnitz and Kobelnitz; (the latter village 
was occupied by the enemy's reserve) a 
pretty he^vy cannonade was opened upon 
Sokolnitz, which destroyed the village. 
These two Russian columns, without con- 


89 


cerning themselves as to the fourth column, 
without any direct communication with it, 
and without being deterred by the offensive 
movements of the enemy, thought of no¬ 
thing but the first disposition, and continued 
their movements upon Sokolnitz ; which 
village they took possession of without much 
resistance, after a long and useless cannon¬ 
ade. General Muller, of the Russian light 
infantry, was wounded and afterwards taken 
prisoner beyond Sokolnitz. In passing this 
village, the two columns crossed upon each 
other, and some confusion ensued. 

We must now, for an instant, leave this 
point, in order to see what was passing in 
the centre, and on the right of the allies, 
while the capture of the villages of Tellnitz 
and Sokolnitz svas going forward. The Em¬ 
peror of the French, who had not failed to 
remark the want of concert and consistency 
in the movements of the Austro-Russian an- 
my, and who saw that by the circuitous 


90 


route the left was obliged to take, it be- 
came more distant from the centie, in pro¬ 
portion as it advanced, immediately put in 
motion the massive columns which he had 
kept together, with a .view of marching 
against the centre, and by that means cut¬ 
ting off the wing, which still imprudently 
continued to advance, for the purpose of 
turning the French army in a position which 
it did not occupy. The Reserve of the 
French army, composed of ten Battalions 
of the Imperial guard, and of ten Battalions 
of General Oudinot's grenadiers, (who re¬ 
covered from his wound, now resumed his 
command) remained upon the heights be¬ 
tween Schlapanitz and Kobelnitz. This 
Reserve did not fire a shot during the whole 
battle. Marshal Soult, with the two divi¬ 
sions of St. Hilaire, and Vandamme (posted 
during the night, as we have already seen, 
in the valley of Kobelnitz), traversed this f 
village and that of Puntowitz, to make an 


91 


attack upon the heights and the village of 
Pratzen. At the same time Marshal Ber- 
nadotte, after having crossed, by means of a 
bad and narrow bridge, (only a few musket 
shots distant from his enemy) the rivulet at 
the village of Girschikowitz, with the divi¬ 
sion of Rivaud on his left, and that of 
Drouet on his right, took his direction upon 
the heights of Blasowitz. The cavalry un¬ 
der Prince Murat formed in several lines on 
the left of Marshal Bernadotte, and march¬ 
ed between Girschikowitz and Krug. Mar¬ 
shal Lannes having on his right the division 
of Caffarelli, and on his left that of General 
Suchet, moved forward to the left of Prince 
Murat, on each side of the causeway. From 
that time the centre and right of the allies 
became engaged in all quarters. The Grand 
Duke Constantine was destined with the 
corps of guards to form the Reserve of the 
right, and quitted the heights in front of 


92 


Austerlitz, at the appointed hour, to occu¬ 
py those of Blasowitz and Krug. He was 
hardly arrived on this point before he found 
himself in first line , and engaged with the 
sharp shooters of Rivaud’s division, and 
Prince Murat’s light cavalry, commanded 
by General Kellermann. The Grand Duke 
hastened to occupy the village of Blaso¬ 
witz with the light infantry Battalion of the 
guards. At the same instant Prince John de 
Liechtenstein arrived with his cavalry. Ac¬ 
cording to the original disposition, this 
Prince was to post himself on the left of 
Prince Bagration, to preserve the com¬ 
mand of the plain in front of Schlapa- 
nitz. This column of cavalry, which had 
been posted in rear of the third column, 
and which was to move by its right flank, 
upon its point of attack, was impeded in 
its march by the columns of infantry, which 
crossed upon it as they were advancing, to 


93 


descend from the heights. Prince Liech¬ 
tenstein had hastened to send, daring the 
march, 10 squadrons, under Lieut.-general 
Uwarrow, to the left of Prince Bagration, 
to secure that general’s left flank, which was 
opposed to a part of Prince Murat’s ca¬ 
valry. After the regiment of Elisabethgrod 
hussars had formed in order of battle^ 
under General Uwarrow, the Grand Duke 
Constantine’s regiment of Hulans became 
the head of the column of cavalry. Prince 
John dc Liechtenstein, when he arrived 
on the Grand Duke’s left, found the enemy 
in presence of the Russian guards; it was 
the cavalry under General Kellermann, sup¬ 
ported by the infantry of Marshal Ber- 
nadotte’s left, and of Marshal Lannes’ right. 
Prince John de Liechtenstein immediately 
determined on forming his cavalry in order 
of battle, to charge the enemy. The Grand 
Duke’s regiment was the first that de¬ 
ployed ; but, carried away by the ardour 


94 

of the brave General* Essen, who com¬ 
manded them; the Hulans did not await 
the formation of the rest of the line, and, 
without support, rushed forward to attack 
the enemy’s light cavalry, which, retiring 
through the intervals of the infantry, was 
pursued with but too much impetuosity 
through the Battalions. The Hulans 
wanted to attack the French cavalry that 
was in second line, but, in consequence of 
the fire they had sustained, they reached it 
in disorder, and were received by it with 
determination. The division of Caffarelli 
formed a line on their right, and that of 
Rivaud on their left, and the Hulans, being 
thus placed between two fires, lost above 


# Either there were two generals of this name in the 
Russian army, or there must be some mistake; since, in 
a former part of this work. General Stutterheim says, 
“ The corps under Essen was at Kremsir on the day of the 
battle, and was of no sort of use.”— Translator . 



95 


400 men; Lieut.-general Essen, who led 
them, was severely wounded, and died in 
consequence. The Grand Duke’s regiment, 
which had made this brilliant charge, at¬ 
tacked too soon, with too much impe¬ 
tuosity, and became the victim of its own ill- 
placed courage. It was put completely 
to the route, and in this state it reached, by 
its right, the corps under Prince Bagration, 
in rear of which it again formed. This last 
general had now moved forward from the 
post of Posorsitz, to oppose the left of 
Marshal Pannes, which rested on Kovalo- 
witz; Prince Bagration had caused the 
villages of Krug and Holubitz to be occu¬ 
pied by General Ulanius, with three Batta¬ 
lions of light infantry. 

We now come to the centre of the allied 
army, where the fate of this day was de¬ 
cided. It was too w r eak to resist the enemy’s 
attacks. Abandoned by the third column, 


96 


tod all the left of the army, while the divi¬ 
sion on the right flank was not sufficiently 
powerful to divide the French forces; the 
centre saw itself attacked, or menaced with 
attack, by four divisions, to which it could 
only oppose 27 very weak Battalions, with¬ 
out any hope of reinforcement. Those 
Russian regiments which had made their 
retreat from Braunau, formed a part of this 
number, and were scarcely composed of 
400 men each. Without exaggeration, we 
may here calculate, that 12,000 men were 
attacked by 24,000, and while the French 
army was not, in fact, so numerous as that 
of the allies, by a more happy arrange¬ 
ment of their force, which was more con¬ 
centrated and better directed, the enemy's 
strength was doubled on that point, which 
was of the greatest importance. The centre 
of the allies was perfectly insulated, which, 
in consequence of the distance the several 


97 


columns (the 2d and 3d excepted) were 
from each other, was the case, nearly, on all 
points. 

The Emperor of Russia, with the Com¬ 
mander in chief, arrived at the head of the 
fourth column, at the moment when it was 
to advance. In order to give time to the 
columns on the left to gain ground, Lieut.- 
general Kollowrath, who commanded the 
fourth column, received orders not to move 
till towards eight o’clock. The action, 
therefore, near Tellnitz, had already begun, 
and the left was in motion, when the centre 
formed, and broke into platoons from the 
left. The Russian infantry, under Lieut.- 
general Miloradowich, was at the head of 
the column. Two of his battalions, of the 
regiments of Novogrod and Apscherousky, 
commanded by Lieut.-colonel Monachtin, 
with some Austrian dragoons of the Arch¬ 
duke John’s regiment, formed the advanced 


G 


98 


guard of the column, and marched only a 
small distance in its front. 

It was now near nine o'clock, and the 
third column had just quitted the heights of 
Pratzen to march, in conformity to the dis¬ 
position, upon Sokolnitz: the fourth column 
had just arrived on the ground occupied, 
during the night, by General Przibischew- 
sky, when a massive column of French in¬ 
fantry was suddenly descried in a bottom, 
in front of Pratzen. As soon as the enemy's 
columns were perceived, they were put in 
motion, at the moment when the Russian 
advanced guard approached the village. 
This massive column of the enemy was 
composed as follows: the right columns 
of the division of Vandammme; those on 
the left, of the division of St. Hilaire. 
Nevertheless, the advanced guard of the 
4th column lost no time in occupying the 
village of Pratzen, and got possession of 


99 


a small bridge beyond it before the ene¬ 
my's sharp shooters. Having passed this 
bridge, it posted a Battalion upon a hill to 
the left, in front of the village, (which was 
not yet left by the rear of the third column) 
while the other Battalion of the advanced 
guard occupied the village itself. 

General Koutousoff, whom this movement 
of the enemy had taken by surprize (think¬ 
ing himself the assailant, and seeing himself 
attacked in the midst of his combinations 
and his movements), felt all the importance 
of maintaining the heights of Pratzen, 
against which the French were moving; 
they commanded every thing, and were the 
only security to the rear of the third column, 
which continued to advance and expose 
itself with the greatest imprudence, forget¬ 
ting the enemy and every thing but the ori¬ 
ginal disposition. It was the summit of the 
heights of Pratzen which decided the fate of 
a 2 


100 


the day. It had been the key to the posi¬ 
tion the'allied army had just quitted; and, 
from the confused situation of the different 
columns their fate depended upon whoever 
was master of this height. As soon as the 
Commander-in-chief, who was at the bead 
of the column, was informed by his advanced 
guard that the enemy was so near him, he 
gave orders for shewing him a front, and for 
occupying the height; at the same time he 
sent for some cavalry from the column un¬ 
der Prince John de Liechtenstein, who sent 
him four Russian regiments. The French 
directed the march of their two masses of 
infantry with great coolness, and at a slow 
pace. A third column of the enemy now 
made its appearance on the right of Prat- 
zen, and threatened to pass through the in¬ 
terval, between the fourth column, and the 
cavalry under Prince John de Liechtenstein. 
This French column was a part of the corps 
under Marshal Bernadotte. Upon this the 


101 


Russian infantry, belonging to the fourth 
column, marched to the right of Pratzen, 
and sent a reinforcement to the Battalions 
of the advanced guard, which were already 
posted on the hill to be maintained ; but 
this advanced guard, being attacked by su¬ 
perior numbers, abandoned it, after a very 
short resistance. 

The action then became very warm, and 
it w r as attempted to regain the ground that 
had been lost by the advanced guard. The 
Russians made an attack; opened their fire 
at too great a distance, and without much 
effect, while the French columns continued 
to advance without firing a shot; but when 
at the distance of about a hundred paces, 
they opened a fire of musketry which be¬ 
came general, and very destructive. The 
enemy opened out his masses by degrees, 
formed in several lines, and marched rapidly 
towards the height, resting his left on the 
church of the village, and his right on the 


102 


most elevated point of the heights. Having 
reached them, he formed in an angular di¬ 
rection, for the purpose of opposing the 
rear of the third column. This was com¬ 
posed of the Brigade under General Ka¬ 
mensky, which had separated from the co¬ 
lumn, and shewed a front upon the height, 
menancing the right flank ot Marshal Soult s 
corps. 

It was still necessary to dislodge the ene¬ 
my from the heights, of which he had ob¬ 
tained possession, and to prevent his estab¬ 
lishing himself on them. 

The Emperor of Russia, who, during this 
sanguinary conflict, had remained with his 
infantry of the fourth column, and who, in¬ 
cessantly, exposed his own person in trying 
to remedy the confusion, ordered his Batta¬ 
lions to advance, and try to take the enemy 
in flank. General Kollowrath received or¬ 
ders to check the enemy on the left, and, 
for that purpose, caused the Austrian Bri- 


103 


gades, under the Generals Jurczeck and 
Rottermund, to advance against the heights, 
on which the French continued to gain 
ground, and extend themselves, more and 
more, while they followed up the Russian 
Battalions that had been thrown forward. 
The first Austrian Battalions made their at« 
tack on the enemy with coolness and intre¬ 
pidity, although they Avere entirely compo¬ 
sed of neAv levies. They fell upon a French 
regiment which had been the first to ad¬ 
vance on the crest of the hill, and which 
Avas nearly surrounded. The French re¬ 
ceived the Austrians Avith firmness, and de¬ 
fended themselves with valour, notwith¬ 
standing Avhicli they Avere forced to retreat; 
but, receiving a reinforcement, they quickly 
regained the ground Avhich they had lost. 
Tavo Russian regiments, belonging to the 
second column, the grenadiers of Fanago- 
risky, and the musketteers of Rhiasky, Avho 
Avere left in Reserve upon the height which 


104 


the column had occupied during the night, 
were ordered, by the General-in-chief, to 
reinforce the Brigade under General Ka¬ 
mensky. The troops commanded by this 
General fought yery bravely during the 
whole of this unfortunate battle. They 
came to the support of the Austrian Bri¬ 
gades; and this reinforcement seemed likely 
to re-establish the balance of power in the 
attack of the crest of the hill; upon which 
the French generals manoeuvred their troops 
with that ability which is the result of a 
military eye, and of experience, taking ad¬ 
vantage of the inequalities of ground to 
cover their troops from fire, and to conceal 
their movements. There was no other 
chance of turning the fate of the day but a 
general and desperate attack at the point of 
the bayonet. The Austrian Brigades, with 
that under General Kamensky, charged the 
etiemy ; the Russians shouting, according to 
their usual custom; but the French received 


105 


them with steadiness, and a well-supported 
fire, which made a dreadful carnage in the 
compact ranks of the Russians. General 
Miloradovich, on his side, advanced upon 
the right; but the Generals Berg and Rep- 
ninsky being wounded, their troops had lost 
that confidence in themselves, without which 
nothing is to be done in war. The ardour 
of this attack soon evaporated. The supe¬ 
rior numbers of the enemy, and his steadi¬ 
ness, soon changed it to a slow uncertain 
pace, accompanied by an ill-directed fire of 
musketry. Nevertheless, the example of 
some of their officers had at one moment 
the effect of inducing the left wing again to 
advance with intrepidity; and, for an in¬ 
stant, the right wing of the French began 
to give way. The regiment of Saltzbourg, 
and the Battalion of Auersperg, fought with 
much courage.* Kamensky's Brigade al- 


# Note by a French Officer .—It is very true, that the 
Austrians fought well, as asserted by the Austrian officer; 



106 


ways distinguished itself. The Austrian 
General, Jurczeck, was severely wounded. 
The enemy, well aware of the importance 
of this post, now in turn attacked the allies, 
who were without any support whatever, 
and absolutely abandoned by the left of the 
army. The fourth column now lost the 
heights of Pratzen, beyond the possibility 
of recovery, together with the greatest part 
of its artillery, which was entangled in the 
deep clay that prevails in that part of the 
country. The greatest possible efforts were 
made to repair the confusion incident to 
such a retreat. Meanwhile, the enemy had 
advanced his artillery, and vigourously plied 
it in cannonading the allies during their re¬ 
treat, which put the finishing stroke to the 
disorder they were in. The Austrian part 


as also that the regiment of Salzbourg particularly distin¬ 
guished itself, and lost a great number of men by the 
bayonet. 



107 


of this column had one general, six superior 
officers, nineteen subalterns, and 1886 sol¬ 
diers killed and wounded ; five officers and 
470 soldiers taken prisoners. This action, 
upon the heights of Pratzen, lasted about 
two hours; after which the fate of the battle 
was decided. The fourth column marched 
upon Waschan, and repaired (as pointed 
out in the disposition) to the position of 
Hodiegitz and Herspitz, where it collected 
its Battalions. The enemy, being once in 
possession of the heights, did not disturb 
this retreat, and remained near Pratzen, 
w r aiting, probably, the event of the 'move¬ 
ments on the left of the allies. After the 
unfortunate attack that was made by the 
Hulans, Lieutenant-general Prince John de 
Liechtenstein, with his cavalry, covered the 
country between Blasowitz and Pratzen. 
The Austrian General, Caramelli, made a 
charge with the Cuirassiers of the regiment 
of Lorraine upon the enemy^s infantry, 


108 


which coming out of Girschikowitz took 
advantage of the vineyards between that 
village and Pratzen, to take the Russians 
in flank. This attack, in which General 
Caramelli had his horse shot under him, had 
the effect of checking the French for a mo¬ 
ment. The Major who commanded the 
regiment, a Count d’Auersperg, was killed. 
Prince John de Liechtenstein also caused 
an attack to be made on the French in¬ 
fantry, by the regiment of Nassau, at which 
time the fourth column had already lost the 
heights of Pratzen, and was put to the 
route. Prince John de Liechtenstein flew 
to its assistance to cover the Retreat with 
the remains of the cavalry. This general 
tried to rally some Austrian Battalions, 
which, like the Russian infantry, were re¬ 
treating in disorder, and was successful in 
his efforts. Ilis horse was killed under him 
by a grape-shot. The cavalry continued to 
occupy th$ bottom of the heights of Prat- 


109 

zen, between that village and Krzenowitz, 
till it was night. 

While the action took this turn on the 
heights of Pratzen, and the cavalry under 
Prince John de Liechtenstein attempted to 
make head, both to the right and left, 
against the enemy's infantry, and a part of 
Prince Murat's cavalry, in order to check, 
or at least retard, the success of the French. 
The Grand Duke, Constantine, also found 
himself engaged in an obstinate contest. 
The yillage of Blasowitz, which he had 
caused to be occupied, as we have before 
seen, was attacked, and carried by the 
corps under Marshal Bernadotte. The 
Grand Duke wishing to check the enemy's 
progress, left the commanding heights on 
which he was posted, and advanced in line 
upon the enemy's columns. A sharp fire of 
musketry ensued. The French sharp-shoot- 
ers, who covered the columns, disputed their 
ground; but were at length driven in by a 


no 


chai'ge with the bayonet, which was ordered 
by the Grand Duke. A sharp connonade, 
attended with much execution, then took 
place on this point. The grape-shot made 
a dreadful carnage; but, at the moment 
when the Prince approached the enemy, 
(who had by this time deployed into line) 
the cavalry of the guards, commanded by 
Marshal Bessieres, which had been posted 
in the intervals of the infantry, made a 
charge on the Russian line, which, being 
without support, was in consequence driven 
back, after a brave resistance. 

The Grand Duke's regiment of horse- 
guards, in order to disengage the infantry, 
made a charge on the enemy's flank, where 
it checked and routed their cavalry, and 
afterwards attacked the Trench infantry, 
which had advanced to support the cavalry. 
It was on this occasion that the regiment 
of horse-guards captured a French eagle 
belonging to a Battalion of the fourth regi- 


Ill 


ment. The corps of guards being obliged 
to retire, succeeded, after considerable loss, 
in rallying and forming its Battalions on 
the heights which it had originally quitted; 
from whence it continued its movement 
upon Austerlitz, marching towards Krzeno- 
witz. The enemy's cavalry again returned 
to the charge, but was checked by the 
horse-guards, and some squadrons of hus¬ 
sars belonging to the guards, who attacked 
the French with the greatest impetuosity at 
the very moment when they were about to 
charge the infantry during its retreat. The 
horse-guards valiantly attacked, and were 
closely engaged with the French horse gre¬ 
nadier guards, who, under the command of 
General Rapp, had arrived to reinforce the 
enemy's cavalry. From that moment the 
Russian guards effected their retreat upon 
Austerlitz, without farther molestation from 
the French, who remained on the heights in 
front of Blasowitz. Prince Repnin, a colo- 


112 


nel of the horse-guards, was wounded and 
made prisoner, with some officers of the 
same corps. The Russian guards suffered 
severely, but had few taken prisoners. 

While these things were passing on the 
left, Prince Bagration, it has been already 
stated, had advanced in front of Posorsitz, 
and had tried to occupy the heights of 
Dwaroschna. Lieutenant-generalUwarrow, 
with the cavalry under his command, was 
upon that Prince's left, near Holubitz; 
which village, as well as that of Krug, had 
been occupied in the manner before de¬ 
scribed; but Marshal Lannes arriving with 
his troops in column on Prince Bagration's 
left, and on the right of the cavalry under 
General Uwarrow, put a stop to the march 
of the right of the allies. In order to cover 
the left of the French army, and to secure 
its retreat in case of disaster, Marshal Lannes 
had posted eighteen pieces of cannon, pro¬ 
tected by the twenty-seventh regiment of 


113 


infantry, upon the commanding height, si* 
tuated between Lesch and Kowalowitz, to 
the left of the causeway leading to Brunn: 
it was the same height that was to have been 
occupied by Prince Bagration. This gene¬ 
ral was under the necessity of reinforcing 
his left (on which a heavy cannonade was 
opened), and of sending almost the whole 
of his cavalry to General Uwarrow, who, in 
consequence, had about thirty squadrons 
under his orders. The enemy succeeded, 
notwithstanding, in driving back General 
Ulanius from the villages of Krug and Ho- 
lubitz, and continued to advance in column; 
their march being protected by a part of 
the cavalry under Prince Murat. This gave 
occasion to some fine charges on the part of 
both the Russian and French cavalry. Ge¬ 
neral Ulanius, who commanded the cavalry 
with the greatest degree of intelligence and 
bravery, succeeded by his efforts in check- 


u 


114 


ing the rapid progress which the enemy 
would otherwise have made on the right of 
the allies. Prince Bagration, after having 
long maintained himself atPosorsitz, retired 
upon the heights of Rausnitz, at the mo¬ 
ment when the Russian guards were quit¬ 
ting the heights in rear of Blasowitz ; and, 
in the evening, received orders to march to 
Austerlitz. The high road to Wischau was 
in consequence left entirely uncovered, on 
which the chief part of the baggage of the 
army was afterwards captured by the ene¬ 
my. Lieutenant-general Uwarrow, with the 
cavalry, protected this retreat; and Prince 
Bagration took post in rear of Austerlitz, 
at six o'clock in the evening, while the ca¬ 
valry under Prince John de Liechtenstein 
still continued to occupy the heights in 
front of that place. 

It now becomes necessary to revert to 
what was passing at Tellnitz and Sokolnitz. 
The first, second, and third columns, were 


115 


left in the act of marching upon the points 
of attack fixed in the primary disposition, 
without thinking of the enemy's movements, 
and without having discrimination enough 
to give that direction to their columns, 
which the nature of the ground and the 
position of the enemy ought to have pointed 
out, at the very first glance. These three 
columns were composed of fifty-five Bat¬ 
talions (without including the Brigade under 
General Kamensky, which had not followed 
them), and were only opposed to the divi¬ 
sion under Legrand, not above five or six 
thousand strong, and to four thousand of 
the corps under Marshal Davoust.* Had 


* Note by a French officer .—General Legrand had only 
one of his brigades with him; the other, commanded by 
General Levasseur, was posted in reserve, in front of the 
rivulet, and of the village of Hobesnitz, from whence it 
marched on the flank and rear of the enemy, when he at- 
H 2 




116 


the left of the allied army observed the 
enemy's movements during the battle, and 
reflected upon his intentions ; had it taken 
advantage of the ground, and seized the 
means which it presented for again concen¬ 
trating itself, in order to execute a bold 
manoeuvre by the height on which the cha¬ 
pel above Aujest is situated, and which ex¬ 
tends quite to Pratzen. Had this been 
done, the battle might yet have been pro¬ 
longed, and at least have given a chance 
that the event of this day would have been 
less decisive. The offensive movement on 
the part of the French disconcerted the at¬ 
tack of the allies ; and, from that moment, 
all concert ceased. 


tempted to retake the heights of Pratzen ; it was this un¬ 
foreseen movement which greatly contributed to the de¬ 
feat of that column. Levasseur’s brigade fought during 
the remainder of the day, in conjunction with the divi¬ 
sions of St. Hilaire and Yandamme. 



117 

The second and third columns were left 
in Sokolnitz, through which the head of the 
latter had passed. It was also stated, that 
the two columns had become entangled du¬ 
ring a thick fog that took place, and they 
were thrown into confusion, in this village, 
where they mutually embarrassed each 
other. At this time that part of the French 
which had been engaged in front of Tell- 
nitz retired upon Sokolnitz ; General Le- 
grand having ordered that village to be 
turned by General Franceschi. When this 
took place, the centre of the allies had al¬ 
ready been penetrated ; and the French were 
in possession of the heights of Pratzen. 
The Russians who were in Sokolnitz, and 
those who had passed through it, when they 
saw themselves surrounded, immediately 
surrendered. Lieutenant-general Przibis- 
chewsky, who had the command of the 
third column, was made prisoner in the val¬ 
ley of Sokolnitz, together with 6,000 men, 


118 


being a part of both columns, which like¬ 
wise lost the whole of their artillery. 

The relics of the second column retreated 
in disorder upon Aujest, and what contin¬ 
ued embodied fell back upon the first co¬ 
lumn. This latter, informed, when too late, 
of the attack made by the French upon the 
centre, intended to move to its support; 
but took a wrong direction to be capable 
of making a diversion in its favour. The 
Austrian cavalry, which had been left be¬ 
yond Tellnitz, retired through that village, 
which was now evacuated, leaving some 
Battalions of infantry, with a few cavalry 
on the hill fronting it, as a corps of obser¬ 
vation, and to secure the march of M. de 
Buxhoevden, who was retiring upon Aujest, 
by the same route he had advanced. To 
protect the flank of the Russian infantry, 
the Szeckler hussars under Prince Maurice 
Liechtenstein, and O'Reilly's light cavalry, 
with two regiments of Cossacks, under Gen- 


/ 


119 


iieral Stutterheim, were advanced upon the 
plain, between the foot of the mountains 
and the villages of Tellnitz and Sokolnitz; 
General Nostitz, with the hussars of Hesse 
Homburg, marched with the column, dhe 
French, after their success in the centre, 
had already brought forward their reserve, 
consisting of 20 Battalions, and had ex¬ 
tended along the crest of the heights that 
were occupied in the morning by the 
allies, from Pratzen to the chapel above 
Aujest, but, as yet, they were not in force, 
and had no cannon above that village. 


* Note by a French officer .—The first column had no 
longer the means of resuming the offensive. The reserve, 
composed of 20 Battalions of grenadiers, had reached the 
heights in rear of the divisions St. Hilaire and Vandamme. 
(The Emperor, with the cavalry belonging to the guards, 
was already descending from the chapel of St. Anthony.) 
The rear of the column was exposed to Marshal Davoust 
and General Legrand. Marshal Bernadotte, alone, had 18 




120 


If the first column of the allies, reinforced 
by some Battalions from the second, and at 
that time consisting of above 30 Battalions, 
had moved in full force upon these heights, 
and had attacked them; if, instead of 
passing through a defile, (the height above 
which was occupied by the enemy,) it had 
made a charge on the flank of the French, 
it is possible that a diversion might have 
been effected in favour of the centre; and a 
defeat in Aujest (which was to be antici¬ 
pated) would at least have been avoided. 
In marching upon the height above Aujest, 
the left of the allies might, at least, give a 


Battalions, not one half of which had burnt priming, and 
the remainder had been but little engaged. 

The French would have gained the victory with 25,000 
men less than they had, which is a subject of reflection for 
military men, and sufficiently shews the influence which 
the being well commanded has over the operations, of 


war. 



121 

chance in favour of the battle; while the 
left, being no longer liable to be put in con¬ 
fusion, would not have lost so many men. 
Even supposing it not to have succeeded in 
maintaining the height, still it had always a 
retreat open upon Scharoditz. 

As soon as the column arrived in Aujest, 
the French rushed like a torrent down upon 
the village, in which a sharp fire of mus¬ 
ketry at first took place, but which was of 
short duration, before they gained posses¬ 
sion of the village. It was the division of 
Vandamme, which had formed the extreme 
right, on the heights of Pratzen, and which, 
in proportion as the French crowned that 
height, had gradually moved upon the 
chapel, above Aujest. The general of in¬ 
fantry, Buxhoevden, with a few Battalions, 
succeeded in passing through the village, 
and rejoined the army near Austerlitz; some 
confusion took place, and 4,000 men were 
taken prisoners in or about Aujest: they also 


122 


lost their artillery. Many of the fugitives 
betook themselves to the lake, which was 
frozen over, but not sufficiently so to pre¬ 
vent many from perishing in it. d he enemy, 
who in the mean time had received his ar¬ 
tillery, vigorously plied the fugitives with 
it, who afterwards passed through Satschan, 
and in the evening succeeded in regaining 
the rear-guard of the army, on the heights 
of Neuhof. After the French had occupied 
Aujest, the centre and rear of the first co¬ 
lumn, which was so very strong, fell back 
under the orders of Lieut.-general Dochto- 
row,upon the plain between Tellnitz and the 
lake. This infantry was collected, but not 
in good order. Lieut.-general Dochtorow 
succeeded for a moment in re-establishing 
order, after which he considered only how 
to effect his retreat. This was very diffi¬ 
cult in the execution, and could only be ef¬ 
fected across a very narrow dike between 
the lakes, on which it was not possible to 


123 


march more than two men in front. There 
was also reason to apprehend that the 
French passing by Aujest and Satschan, 
round the lake, would thus cut off the dike, 
the only retreat now left to the Russians, 
which would have made it impossible to sare 
this last wreck of the left wing of the allied 
army. Lieut.-general Kienma\ r er, with the 
hussars of Hesse Hombourg, was sent over 
in advance, for the purpose of securing this 
retreat, and posted himself upon the 
heights between Satschan and Ottnitz, in 
order to observe this point. Meanwhile, 
the Austrian cavalry continued to support 
General Dochtorow, and for that purpose 
advanced into the plain, between Aujest 
and Sokolnitz. The generals who com¬ 
manded O’Reilly's light cavalry and the 
Szeckler hussars, advanced to the attack of 
two French regiments of dragoons, who ap¬ 
proached from Sokolnitz, but seeing that the 
Russian infantry was supported, the latter 


124 


marched by their left, upon fhe height near 
Aujest, and posted themselves at the head 
of the division of Vandamme. The conclu¬ 
sion of this battle was very remarkable, 
since the French troops of the right wing 
were turning their backs upon Austerlitz 
to attack the remains of the left of the al¬ 
lies; to do which, the French were now 
quitting the same heights, whence the allies 
had marched in the morning, to attack 
them. When the first column had ad¬ 
vanced, the lake was the point of appuy to 
the right of the French ; at this moment it 
was the appuy to their left , while the Rus¬ 
sians had their right upon it. 

It was now about two o'clock in the af¬ 
ternoon; the action was decided and finished 
along the rest of the line, when the division 
of Vandamme advanced to complete it. 
In rear of Tellnitz, between that village and 
Menitz, was a hill of considerable elevation, 
the right of which was on the lake. To this 


125 


hill the Russian infantry retired, still under 
the protection of the Austrian cavalry, 
which was every instant mowed down by 
discharges of grape-shot. The village of 
Tellnitz, which has already been described 
as surrounded by ditches, presented the 
means of defence, which were taken ad¬ 
vantage of; and to give time to the rest of 
the column to file off, a regiment of Russian 
infantry, under Major General Lewis, was " 
posted behind these ditches, where it was 
attacked, but defended itself with resolu¬ 
tion, From that time, General Dochtorow 
continued his retreat. The cavalry occu¬ 
pied the hill that has been rpentioned, in 
order to save a great part of this column, 
which was again in the greatest possible 
confusion. The French got possession of 
Tellnitz (in which a great many Russian 
Stragglers were taken prisoners), and bringing 
the light artillery of the guards down to the 
edge of the lake, for the purpose of driving 


126 


the Austrian cavalry from their post on the 
hill, they opened a fire on the flank of 
O’Reilly's light cavalry, and destroyed a 
great part of it. Yet nothing could prevent 
this brave regiment from continuing to 
cover the retreat of the Russians with the 
greatest intrepidity<■ 

Colonel Degenfeldt posted his light ar¬ 
tillery, which commanded that of the 
French, with so much judgment as to damp 
the ardour of their fire. The Colonel of the 
Szeckler hussars was desperately wounded 
in the head with a grape-shot. 

The Russian infantry, fatigued and ex¬ 
hausted, retired very slowly, and the cavalry 
had a long time to support their post; at 
length, however, this famous dike, the only 
remaining retreat to the wreck of the first 
column of the allies, and which had justly 
been the subject of so much uneasiness, was 
happily passed; still, however, the French 
(who occupied the hill, before in possession 


127 


of the cavalry, as soon as they quitted it) 
continued to fire on them, with their artil¬ 
lery, till they were completely out of reach. 
Having passed the dike, the two Austrian 
Generals, who protected General Dochto- 
row's retreat, halted on the heights in front 
of Neuhoff, and tried to restore order in the 
Russian Battalions, which yet formed a 
corps of at least 8,000 men. It was then 
about four o'clock, and already began to 
grow dark. The retreat was then continued 
by Boschowitz; the troops marched the 
whole night, under a heavy fall of rain, 
which completed the destruction of the 
roads ; the remaining artillery sunk in the 
sloughs, and were abandoned. The Austrian 
cavalry formed the rear guard, without be¬ 
ing pursued by the French, who halted on 
the dike. The regiment of O'Reilly brought 
ofif its artillery. 


128 


The French army took up the position oc¬ 
cupied by the' allied army the preceding 
night; the latter, after the greatest exer¬ 
tion on the part of the two Emperors to re¬ 
medy the general confusion on the field of 
battle, retired in the evening completely 
behind Austerlitz, into the position of Ho- 
diegitz. But the very considerable loss it 
had sustained in killed and wounded, and 
the number of those who were prisoners, or 
missing ; more especially of the first, second, 
third, and fourth columns, made this army, 
on its arrival in rear of Austerlitz, in a very 
feeble state; at least, as far as regards its 
disposcable force. The Austrian cavalry, 
commanded by General Prince Hohenlohe, 
(who was sent to replace Prince John de 
Liechtenstein that same night, on the latter 
being charged with a mission to the Empe¬ 
ror Napoleon:) this cavalry, alone, had 
some detachments in front of Austerlitz, 


129 


and formed the rear guard of the army. 
Thus dosed this ever-memorable day. 

Should any errors of detail have crept 
into the foregoing narrative, those military 
men who have been engaged in actual ser¬ 
vice will know how to make allowances for 
them; they will know, from experience* how 
difficult it is to procure exact information, 
as to the minute particulars of a great bat¬ 
tle. Two persons rarely see the same object 
in a similar point of view. But, as to the 
general arrangement, the plans, and the 
principal movements, their execution, and 
their result, my pen has been strictly guided 
by the love of truth, an accurate knowledge 
of what was done, and the utmost impar¬ 
tiality. 

It will not have escaped the observation 
of the experienced soldier, that it is princi¬ 
pally to the following causes that the loss 
of this battle is to be attributed. To the 


x 


130 

want of correctness in the information pos¬ 
sessed by the allies, as to the enemy’s army; 
to the bad plan of attack, supposing the 
enemy to have been entrenched in a posi¬ 
tion which he did not occupy; to the move¬ 
ments executed the day before the attack, 
and in sight of the enemy, in order to gain 
the right flank of the French; to the great 
interval between the columns when they 
quitted the heights of Pratzen; and to their 
want of communication with each other. 
To these causes may be attributed the first 
misfortunes of the Austro-Russian army. 
But, in spite of these capital errors, it would 
still have been possible to restore the for¬ 
tune of the day, in favour of the allies, if 
the second and third columns had thought 
less of the primary disposition, and attend¬ 
ed more to the enemy, who, by the bold¬ 
ness of his manoeuvre, completely overthrew 
the basis on which the plan of attack was 
founded; or, if the first column (which pos- 


131 


sessed the means of doing so), instead of re¬ 
tiring by Aujest, as before mentioned, had 
marched to the assistance of the two for¬ 
mer, and, together with them (or at least 
with what remained of them) had moved 
upon the heights, of which the French had 
as yet but a precarious possession, so long 
as the left of the allies was unbroken, and 
their extreme right, which made only feeble 
demonstrations, continued at Posorsitz. 

No computation has been made in this 
work, as to the loss of the two armies, at the 
battle of Austerlitz. It is impossible for 
any one, though actually bearing a part in 
the action, to calculate with any degree of 
accuracy the number of killed and wounded 
on each side. 

The carnage made on the 2nd December 
was very great. The few Austrian troops 
there yet remained were not collected on 
one point; but, as we have seen, conducted 
i 2 


132 


themselves every where with constancy and 
animation. The sixth Battalions of the re¬ 
giments of YVurtemberg and Reuss-Graitz 
were the only corps that were in confusion 
at the time when the fourth column was 
defeated. The Russians, at the commence¬ 
ment, fought with intrepidity, and the 
guards and Hulans distinguished them¬ 
selves for their courage. The French in¬ 
fantry manoeuvred with coolness and pre¬ 
cision, fought with courage, and executed 
its bold movements With admirable concert. 
After having made some efforts, without 
effect, the Russian Battalions began to wa¬ 
ver ; confusion and, finally, complete defeat 
were the consequences of the imprudent 
conduct of the second and third columns. 

The fourth column of the allies aban¬ 
doned a part of its artillery. The first, se¬ 
cond, and third columns, lost the zvhole of 
theirs, with the exception of General Kien- 
mayer s corps, which saved its cannon. The 


133 


guns were entangled in the sloughs, as be¬ 
fore mentioned, and the Russian horses, 
which are more calculated for speed than 
for draft, could not drag them out of the 
deep clay, into which they had sunk. The 
number of the Russian prisoners may be 
computed at 15,000 men; while their killed 
and wounded must have been very consi¬ 
derable; in addition to which, as always 
happens on such occasions, they had a great 
number of soldiers missing. 

The loss of the French army must also, 
necessarily, have been very considerable. 
The fire, at the commencement of the ac¬ 
tion, was too warmly kept up, not to have 
done great execution; still, however, the 
French force was by no means diminished 
in the same proportion as that of the allies. 
The Generals who were killed, wounded, 
and taken prisoners are already well known. 


The 3d and 4th of December. 


THE Austro-Russian army had experi¬ 
enced so many difficulties in regard to its 
subsistence, on the line of operations it 
had followed previous to these offensive 
movements, that it was abandoned, during 
the retreat, in order to direct its march 
upon Hungary. The allies quitted the po¬ 
sition of Hodiegitz at 12 o’clock at night, 
and marched upon Czeitsch, where they 
arrived on the morning of the third of 
December. The column under General 
Dochtorow arrived at Niskowitz, on the 


135 


road to ^Hungary, where it found General 
Kienmayer then forming the rear-guard of 


* Note by a French officer .—It is too ridiculous to sup¬ 
pose that the Russian army, without artillery, without bag¬ 
gage, and without provisions, would have preferred a re¬ 
treat by its flank (which exposed it to the danger of being 
surrounded by the French army) to that upon Olmutz: 
but, in the course of this day, it lost its line of operation, 
which was the high road to Olmutz, and nothing re¬ 
mained for it but to move upon Goeding; and it did not 
gain much by that; for, had it not been for the too great 
clemency of the Emperor, and the armistice, which was 
concluded, the remains of the Russian army would have 
been entirely destroyed ; as may be perceived from what 
the Austrian officer lets fall a little farther on.—The loss 
of a battle is no proof of want of talent in a general: but 
the loss of his artillery and baggage, of his line of opera¬ 
tions, and his retreat, are positive evidence that he is igno¬ 
rant of the art of war. 

An army, so commanded, never could make head against 
a French army in so great and difficult a warfare. The 
emperor took advantage of the faults committed by the 
enemy, who would have committed yet greater errors had 
the emperor retired behind Brunn: the latter would have 




136 


the allies. This Russian column conti¬ 
nued its march, for the purpose of rejoining 
the army at Czeitsch; but lost a consider¬ 
able number of men during the night, who 
had straggled and lost themselves in the 
woods and villages. The Austrian cavalry, 
which had protected the retreat of these 
wrecks of the left wing of the combined 
army, and which was a part of the corps 
under M. de Kienmayer, halted at Nisko- 
witz. Lieut.-General Prince Bagration was 
a league in rear of this Austrian corps, oc¬ 
cupying the heights of Urschutz. Between 
Niskowitz and Urschutz is a large wood, 
under cover of which, the French had it in 
their power to surround and cut off the 


been in greater force; and had already planned new com¬ 
binations, in the course of which, the general who pos¬ 
sessed most experience, and the greatest genius for the art 
of war, must naturally have taken his adversary at a 
disadvantage. 



137 


corps under M. de Kienmayer, which 
was thus too much pushed forward. He 
therefore remained in this position no longer 
than was necessary to give time to the 
stragglers of the army, and to some bag¬ 
gage to fall back upon Urschutz, and to 
obtain some knowledge of the enemy's 
movements. As soon as the French, who 
had entered Austerlitz in the morning, 
began to advance, General Kienmayer fell 
back upon General Bagration, and in front 
of Saruschitz formed the support of that 
Prince's corps. A detachment of O'Reilly's 
light cavalry, and some Cosacks, were sent 
to Stanitz, to watch that foad. The corps 
under M. de Merveldt had received orders to 
retire from Lunenbourg, in the direction of 
Goeding, to observe the country on the left* 
and principally the two roads of Auspitz and 
Nicolsbourg. 

On the third of December, the French 
army advanced in the following manner: 


138 


The cavalry, under Prince Murat, which 
had pushed forward detachments upon 
Rausnitz and Wischau (on the evening of 
the same day on which the battle was 
fought) pursued that route, and made im¬ 
mense booty: it advanced beyond Prosnitz, 
and then sent out strong detachments upon 
Kremsir. 

Marshal Lannes at first took the same 
road, and then moved by his right, to gain 
the right of the allies by Butschowitz and 
Stanitz. Marshals Soult and Bernadotte, 
the imperial guards, and the grenadiers of 
the reserve, were posted on the route 
towards Hungary, as soon as the Emperor 
Napoleon had received information of the 
direction taken by the allied army; they 
advanced, however, but slowly; probably 
with a view to give time to the extreme 
right of their army to gain ground on the 
left of the allies. 

Marshal Davoust marched upon the left 


139 


flank of the Austro-Russian army, by the 
route of Nicolsbourg, (in which was the 
division of Gudin,) and by that of Auspitz, 
in which was the remainder of that corps; 
these two roads unite within half a league 
of Goeding. 

Prince Bagration had placed some out¬ 
posts in the wood of Urschutz. The 
French, about two o'clock in the afternoon, 
began to reconnoitre it, obtained possession 
of the wood, and established themselves on 
the skirts of it. A trifling affair ensued, 
which lasted about two hours, and which 
terminated by General Bagration maintain¬ 
ing his post, which, however, he evacuated 
that evening, retiring towards Czeitsch; 
General Kienmayer posted himself in his 
front, upon the heights of Nasedlowitz, 
pushing forward his out-posts in the direc¬ 
tion of Urschutz. 

The 4th of December the allied army cros¬ 
sed the river March, and arrived at Hollitsch, 


140 


much diminished in numbers, and with 
very few effectives, compared with the 
army to which it was opposed. The Em¬ 
peror Alexander took up his quarters in the 
castle of Iiollitsch, while the Emperor of 
Germany remained at Czeitsch, to be ready 
for the interview which was about to take 
place with the Emperor Napoleon. 

An armistice had been agreed on, to take 
place at day-break on the 4th December. 
Prince John de Liechtenstein had returned 
from the head-quarters of the French the 
evening before with this intelligence. But 
their advanced guard, probably from not 
having received timely orders on this sub¬ 
ject, advanced to attack the fore-posts oi 
M. de Kienmayer’s corps, which remained 
upon the heights of Nasedlowitz. Prince 
Bagration then retired quite behind Czeitsch. 
However, this misunderstanding, and the 
firing consequent upon it, were soon put a 
stop to. A suspension of arms took place. 


141 


and the space of about a league and a half 
was left between the out-posts of the two ar¬ 
mies. That of the French had advanced, and 
taken up its position in several lines, be¬ 
tween Damborschutz, and Saruschutz, in 
front of Urschutz. 

It was then that the famous interview* 
which gave peace to the two empires, took 
place between the Emperor Francis II. and 
Napoleon ; it passed at a little distance from 
the village of Nasedlowitz, near a mill, by 
the side of the high-road, and in the open 
air. The conversation of these two sove¬ 
reigns lasted some time, when the Emperor 
of Germany returned to Czeitsch, which he 
reached in the evening, and immediately 
set about informing his ally of the result of 
the interview.—For this purpose, an Aus¬ 
trian general was to be sent immediately to 
Hollitsch; and General Savary, aid-de- 
camp to the Emperor Napoleon, was named 


142 


by his sovereign, in the first instance to 
attend the Emperor Francis II. and after¬ 
wards to accompany the general that should 
be sent to Hollitsch. In case his Majesty, 
the Emperor of all the Russias, should con¬ 
sent to the conditions of the armistice, Ge¬ 
neral Savary was empowered to counter¬ 
mand the march of Marshal Davoust s 
corps, and was afterwards to accompany the 
Austrian general, to acquaint the corps of 
M. de Merveldt with the suspension of 
arms. General Stutterheim, who was with 
the rear-guard of the corps, near which the 
interview took place, was charged by his so¬ 
vereign with this commission. It was twelve 
o’clock at night before these two generals 
reached Hollitsch, where they had the hap¬ 
piness of obtaining immediate access to the 
presence of the Emperor Alexander, who 
received them with kindness, and threw no 
obstacle in the way of the armistice. Upon 


145 


this they again departed immediately to find 
out the corps under M. de Merveldt, and to 
countermand that under Marshal Davoust: 
the former they fell in with at two o'clock in 
the morning, retiring upon Goeding. M. de 
Merveldt, we have already seen, was 
charged with the protection of the left 
flank of the Russian army; but the whole 
force under his orders did not exceed 4,000 
infantry and 500 cavalry, which made it 
impossible for him to impede the march of 
the right of the French army. The two 
generals succeeded in falling in with Mar¬ 
shal Davoust at Josephsdorf, at about four 
o'clock in the morning. General Gudin's 
advanced guard was at Neudorf. According 
to the agreement between the Emperor 
Francis II. and Napoleon, all the troops 
remained in the exact situation in which 
they were found upon the cessation of hos¬ 
tilities being made known to them. The 


144 


following day Prince John de Liechten- 
sten returned to Austerlitz (which was the 
head-quarter of the Emperor Napoleon) 
for the purpose of negociating the boundary 
to be observed by the respective armies 
during the continuation of the armistice 
which preceded the peace concluded be¬ 
tween Austria and France. 

On the 4th December, the very day on 
which the armistice took place, the Arch¬ 
duke Ferdinand, who could not be made 
acquainted with it, and who had received 
orders to advance and observe the Bava¬ 
rians that remained at Iglau, after the de¬ 
parture of Marshal Bernadotte: on this day, 
that prince attacked General Wrede (to 
keep him in check) with some troops, the 
remnant of his corps; with which he suc¬ 
ceeded in driving him from Iglau. 

The Archduke Charles, obliged to retreat 
in consequence of the unheard of c^tas- 


145 


trophe that happened to the German army, 
arrived in Hungary, with his army quite 
entire, after having at Caldiero incapaci¬ 
tated the French army of Italy from doing 
him any mischief. 

It appears, then, that wherever their ge¬ 
nerals allowed the Austrian troops to fight, 
they fought well; and it would be a very 
rash, and a very false opinion, to impute the 
misfortunes of the war of 1805 to them. 
In that, as well as in all former instances, 
the Austrian army distinguished itself by its 
courage, its devotion to the cause, its con¬ 
stancy in supporting unheard of privations, 
and by its implicit obedience. It was at 
Ulm that these brave troops, victims to the 
conduct of M. Mack, were subjected to 
that heart-breaking fate which was the de¬ 
struction of the German army. But, at 
Ulm, many regiments that had not fired a 
single shot were obliged to surrender, in 

K 


146 


consequence of the operations pursued, and 
in pursuance of orders given by that M. 
Mack, who talked of burying himself in the 
ruins of Ulm; who always talked of death, 
yet feared to die. 


THE ESP. 


TO THE OFFICERS OF THE BRITISH ARMY. 


T. GODDARD takes this opportunity of returning 
thanks to his numerous Military Friends for the liberal 
encouragement he has already experienced, and begs leave 
to assure them, that such attention shall be paid to their 
future favours as will, he trusts, ensure to him a continu¬ 
ance of that patronage and preference he has already met 
with 

He has also the honour to inform them, they can at 
any time be immediately supplied with every Publication 
connected with the finance, interior management, eco¬ 
nomy, and discipline of the army. Printed Review, In¬ 
spection, and Monthly Returns for Cavalry and Infantry; 
Returns of Arms, Clothing, and Appointments; Attesta¬ 
tions, Furloughs, Discharges, Regimental and Orderly 
Books, Paymasters Account Books, and Stationary of 
every description, for home or foreign service. Regula¬ 
tions, Instructions, &c. 

General and Staff Officers supplied with Boxes of Sta¬ 
tionary, fitted up in the most convenient and portable 
manner, with every article allowed by the King’s Regula¬ 
tions. 

New and correct forms of Staff Contingent Ac¬ 
counts, with all the required Certificates printed. 

The following publications are particularly recom¬ 
mended : 

The AIDE-DE-CAMP,or Staff Officer’s Assistant, 
containing correct statements of the pay, allowances, and 
contingencies granted to every officer when employed on 
the staff in Great Britain. 




e 


Instructions for Officers employed on, or Em¬ 
barking for foreign Service; containing his Ma¬ 
jesty’s Regulations, together with forms and complete di¬ 
rections for stating and certifying claims for losses of per¬ 
sonal baggage, camp equipage, chargers, and bat horses, 
whether lost, or shot for the glanders. Necessaries 
of Non-commissioned Officers and Private Soldiers, 
Regimental Clothing and Appointments, &c. &c. See. 
To which are added all the new Regulations rela¬ 
tive to the Increased Pay, Allowances, and Passage 
Money of Men and Officers, both at Home and on Em¬ 
barking for Foreign Stations, with a variety of other ne¬ 
cessary information. 

A Chart, shewing the comparative Rank of every Of¬ 
ficer in the Army, Navy, Marines, Ordnance, Artillery, 
Engineers, Medical Department, Militia, Volunteers, 
&c. &c. See. Sec. 

An OFFICER’S LAST LEGACY to his Wife and Fami¬ 
ly ; being a complete Collection of the Rules, Orders, Regu¬ 
lations, and Instructions, relative to the Pension and Allow¬ 
ances granted by Government to the Widows and Or¬ 
phans of Officers dying in his Majesty’s Service, whether 
belonging to the Army, Navy, Artillery, or Marines. 

Together with correct Tables of the Pensions., as in¬ 
creased from the 25th of June, 1806; as also of the King’s 
Bounty to the Widows and Relations of Officers Killed in 
Action or Dying of their Wounds, and Forms of the Ap¬ 
plications, Affidavits, and Certificates, necessary for ob¬ 
tain g the same, &c. &c. &c. 


Marchant, Printer, 3 , Greville-Street, Hoiborn. 







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